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CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Importance of Grain Marketing and Farm Supply Cooperatives
Grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives are a major economic force
in Kansas and the United States. According to Cobia, cooperatives are
user-owned and controlled businesses which distribute benefits (profits)
on the basis of use [Cobia, 1988].
Approximately 40% of the grain and 28% of all the farm products produced
in the United States are marketed through cooperatives. In addition, 26%
of the major farm inputs (excluding machinery and borrowed capital) are
supplied by cooperatives [Cobia, 1988, p. 1] . Cooperatives have an even
larger impact on the agricultural economy in Kansas. Cooperatives account
for 50-60% of the assembly, storage and handling capacity of the grain
industry in Kansas. They also provide for 40-50% of the petroleum, feed,
fertilizer and chemical sales in Kansas [Barton, 1977]. In comparison to
other states in 1985, Kansas cooperatives rank eighth in numbers and in
gross volume of total marketing and farm supply business. In addition,
Kansas ranks seventh in grain volume marketed through cooperatives [USDA,
Farmer Cooperative Statistics , pp. 15, 27, 32].
The true importance of grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives can
not be quantified by only measuring their market share proportions. Since
cooperatives are owned and controlled by their patrons, they provide their
patron-owners with protection against monopolistic forces. Thus, not only
do patron-owners benefit from the cooperative but other producers
patronizing investor owned firms benefit as well. Ultimately, consumers
benefit through lower prices.
The effect of cooperatives on the market is shown in figure l.A.l when
there is only one firm in the market place (a monopoly) . This equilibrium
Is based on Cotterill's analysis [Cotterill, pp. 182-212]. If the firm
in the market place is an investor owned firm, the market equilibrium
price will be Pi and Qi will be sold to producers. The profit per unit for
the monopoly is Pi minus ACi. Royer concludes that for a supply
cooperative the maximum welfare gain for cooperative members occurs when
the sum of the members' profits from on- farm operations plus cooperative
net margins (patronage refunds) are at a maximum [Royer, p. 30]. This
condition is expressed in terms of maximizing the sum of the cooperative's
producer surplus and the aggregate Hicks Ian consumer surplus members
derive from purchasing the product from a supply cooperative [Royer, p.
36] . The surpluses can be maximized by charging P2 and selling Q2 and are
represented by the area P2245. Equilibrium for the cooperative in this
case is where the marginal cost curve equals the aggregate farmer demand
and members will receive a patronage refund of P2 minus AC2. If the
cooperative operates on an at cost basis (no patronage refunds), P3 is
charged, Q3 is sold and equilibrium is established where average cost
equals the aggregate farmer demand. The same equilibrium will occur when
patrons realize and expect their patronage refunds.
The analysis is similar for oligopolies and grain marketing
cooperatives. In Cotterill's most realistic market models, cooperatives
seek to maximize quantity sold (bought) given market demand (supply)
subject to covering operating costs. This suggests that cooperatives
never pay patronage refunds, which is not the case. Cooperatives
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regularly pay patronage refunds. According to Cotterill, the discrepancy
lies in the fact that the cost curves in cooperative models assume that
the cooperative capital earned its opportunity cost rate of return which
is not true in actual practice [Cotterill, p. 211]. Cotterill goes on to
evaluate optimum investment strategies based on the assumption that
cooperatives in equilibrium may have positive patronage refunds to cover
fully the opportunity cost of invested funds. Another argument is that
the discrepancy is due instead to the equity redemption policies of
cooperatives. If cooperatives do not redeem deferred patronage refunds
for long periods of time, patrons do not place any value on the deferred
patronage refunds. Thus, patrons' realized price is not reduced (supply
cooperative). In figure l.A.l, the cooperative charges P^, sells Qi and
gives patrons a patronage refund of very little value per unit of Pi minus
ACx . The patronage refund is of very little value because of the positive
time value associated with money.
Equity Redemption: Following Cooperative Principles and Practices
Because of their large market shares and monopoly protection, it is
essential for cooperatives to be properly managed. Otherwise, market
access and monopoly protection for producers would be in jeopardy. Five
traditional principles provide guidance for cooperative organization and
management [Cotterill, p. 178].
1. Operation at cost,
2
.
Democratic control by members
,
3 Ownership by members
,
4. Limited returns on equity capital, and
5. Duty to educate.
In addition, there are other traditional policies that verge on being
cooperative principles and are considered to be cooperative business
practices [Shaars, pp. 183-203].
6. Financing in proportion to patronage,
7. Selling goods at market prices,
8. Striving for operational efficiency,
9. Growth through horizontal and vertical integration,
10. Control or own marketing facilities, and
11. Remain neutral on political, religious and racial issues.
Recently, the cooperative theory is focused on being proportional to
patronage. The principles and practices are interrelated and can be
summarized with four basic principles based on proportionality [Cobia,
1988, p. 43].
1. Voting is by members in proportion to patronage,
2. Equity is provided by patrons in proportion to patronage,
3. Net income is distributed to patrons as patronage refunds on
a cost basis and
4. No dividends paid on equity.
In practice, the proportionality basic principles are getting much
discussion, especially financing in proportion to patronage and
proportional control. However, democratic control or one vote per member
is prevalent and this is such a political issue that it is doubtful in the
near future whether proportional control will be implemented. The
proportional principle of distributing net income to patrons as patronage
refunds on a cost basis or operation at cost has long been a cooperative
principle and is in wide use. This study considers the following
cooperative principles as basic: 1) democratic control, 2) proportional
financing and 3) operation at cost.
It is questionable whether cooperatives are managed and operated
according to the basic cooperative principles when the cooperative's
equity redemption policies are considered. First, the principle of
operation at cost is violated with inequitable equity redemption
alternatives. Equity redemption alternatives are policies or plans
cooperatives use to return or redeem deferred patronage refunds to
patrons. Alternatives which do not closely follow the basic cooperative
principles are considered inequitable in this study. If equity redemption
alternatives do not redeem patronage refunds for long periods of time with
no return on the patronage refunds, the patronage refunds are of greatly
reduced value to patrons. Cooperatives utilize the capital for free if
no opportunity cost of capital is paid to the patrons. Fischer concludes
that when the opportunity cost of capital is not realized by cooperatives,
over expansion and investment in assets with low profitability can occur
[Fischer, p. 286]
.
The principle of patron control also suffers with inequitable equity
redemption policies. If patrons believe that their investments in the
cooperative is of little value, their desire to control the cooperative
is reduced. When equity redemption alternatives do not redeem the
investments of retired or deceased patrons, the cooperative is not owned
by its current users [Centner, p. 125]. If the memberships of retired and
deceased patrons are revoked and their equity is not redeemed, these
members then have no control over their investment.
Equity redemption policies dictate how close a cooperative is following
the financing in proportion to patronage principle. Inequitable equity
redemption alternatives place large amounts of investments in the hands
of retired or inactive patrons. When no returns on investment are paid,
current patrons' patronage refunds are supplemented by the inactive
patrons because the current patrons are not paying for the full
capitalization cost of the cooperative.
In summary, the advantages (i.e., monopoly protection) of a cooperative
over an investor owned firm disappear when the basic cooperative
principles are violated with inequitable equity redemption policies. This
is further demonstrated when the economic justification for cooperatives
is examined.
Eauitv Redemption: Economic Justification
The primary justification for cooperatives is that they provide a
superior market equilibrium from a Pareto optimum viewpoint. With the
presence of cooperatives, less of the producers' and consumers' surpluses
are captured through the increased bargaining power of cooperative members
[Stokdyk, pp. 68-73]. However, this justification can be nullified by
inequitable equity redemption policies. Earlier, the basic cooperative
market model is described. When patronage refunds are of little value to
patrons (through inequitable equity redemption policies), the equilibrium
price and output do not change from those established by investor owned
firms. Deferred patronage refunds become of little value to patrons with
equity redemption policies that pay no return on deferred patronage and/or
hold them for long periods of time. As a result, inequitable equity
redemption policies make producers and consumers digress towards a
situation where they are no better off with cooperatives than without
them.
High cash patronage refunds can partly compensate for inequitable equity
redemption policies' low value to member/patrons. High cash patronage
refunds put money in the hands of patrons sooner so there is a smaller
amount of deferred patronage that is subject to inflation. However, high
cash patronage refunds do not equitably distribute ownership to patrons
and the financing in proportion to patronage principle is still violated.
Equity Redemption: Legal Ramifications
Historically, cooperatives have been reluctant to redeem deferred
patronage refunds. Manuel did a survey of Kansas cooperatives in 1950 and
found that only 10 percent of the cooperatives had an equity redemption
policy [Manuel, p. 12] . The old adage that a person had to die to get his
equity out of a cooperative was not true. People could not get their
equity out of a cooperative even after they died. Kansas cooperatives
have shown a significant improvement in their equity redemption policies.
In 1980-81, Newman also surveyed Kansas cooperatives and 99 percent
reported an equity redemption policy [Newman, AFR, 1983, p. 43].
Nationally in 1974, 71 percent of the cooperatives had equity redemption
policies [Brown & Volkin, p. 5].
The resistance of cooperatives to redeem deferred patronage refunds has
prompted present and former member/patrons to seek help from the
legislative and judicial branches of government. Although the state of
Kansas does not have mandatory equity redemption language in its statutes
,
five states have binding equity redemption language in their statutes.
This means that they must redeem equity by law. The state of Kansas and
15 other states have language that could be interpreted as binding equity
redemption language [Cook, pp. 15-17]. The judiciary has not yet chosen
to interpret the law as binding. However, it is speculated that if
cooperatives do not adopt proper equity redemption policies, the judiciary
could reverse their interpretation of the law.
Legislative bodies at both the state and federal levels have also
grappled with equity redemption in cooperatives. In 1966 and 1969, the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress nearly enacted mandatory
equity redemption procedures for farmer cooperatives [Cook, pp. 12-13].
These equity redemption policies require cooperatives to pay 50 percent
cash patronage refunds and redeem deferred patronage refunds within 15
years of their deferment. Cook states that legislation and court cases
concerning farmer cooperative equity redemption at the federal and state
levels have been increasing at an alarming rate. Again, it is
hypothesized that if cooperatives do not improve their equity redemption
policies they will be faced with mandatory equity redemption policies.
In 1979, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported to the U.S.
Congress on farmer cooperatives. One of the key issues addressed in this
report was equity redemption. The GAO recommended that the Secretary of
Agriculture should:
"...direct the Cooperatives Unit to conduct,
jointly with the Extension component of the
Department's Science and Education
Administration, a national campaign to motivate
cooperatives to adopt voluntarily equity
redemption programs that are fair to both
current and former members. We recommend
further that if cooperatives are not willing to
adopt more equitable equity redemption programs
voluntarily, the Secretary develop a
legislative proposal to make it mandatory for
cooperatives to
1. pay interest or dividends on retained
equities,
2. retire retained equities within a certain
time, or
3. pay interest or dividends on retained
equities and retire retained equities
within a certain time.
The legislation should include a clause that
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cooperatives that do not comply with the
requirements would lose their tax exemption
status [GAO, pp. 44-45]."
At least three fourths of the equity redemption policies in Newman's
Kansas study are considered inequitable by the GAO [Newman, p. 43].
Nationally, 49 percent of the equity redemption policies are inequitable
[Brown & Volkin, p. 5]. The political and economic climate suggests that
cooperatives voluntarily adopt proper (equitable) equity redemption
policies. Otherwise, mandatory equity redemption policies are probable.
There are differing opinions on the effect of mandatory equity
redemption on cooperatives. Conley and Lewis did a comparative study on
cooperatives with and without equity redemption policies. They conclude
that some sort of equity redemption policy can be adopted by practically
all cooperatives if it is properly planned and budgeted for by management
[Conley & Lewis, pp. 51-59]. The Conley and Lewis study is only a
comparative study and did not assess the financial impact of equity
redemption policies by comparing the financial condition of cooperatives
before and after implementation of equity redemption policies. Dahl,
Dobson, and Veium improve on the Conley and Lewis study by comparing the
before and after effects on solvency and financial condition of
implementing equity redemption policies [Dahl et al., pp. 31-39]. This
study on Wisconsin cooperatives determines that the solvency and financial
strength of cooperatives is significantly reduced with mandatory equity
redemption policies. Royer argues that the Wisconsin study is too
restrictive and that to truly understand the impacts of mandatory equity
redemption policies, the level of cash patronage refunds, length of
revolving period (or percentage of the equity pool redeemed each year) and
10
rate of growth should be examined in addition to solvency and financial
strength [Royer, pp. 30-40]. In general, Royer concludes that
implementation of mandatory equity redemption policies would primarily
reduce cooperatives' financial flexibility and increase their financial
burden.
In summary, cooperatives need to do a better job of retiring and
servicing member/patron's equity if they are going to:
1. Follow basic cooperative principles,
2. Be economically justifiable and
3. Avoid mandatory equity redemption policies.
Kansas grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives need to determine the
improvements, if any, they can make in their equity redemption policies
to meet the prescribed goals.
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B. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Objectives
An equity redemption policy has several facets including cash patronage
percentage, interest or dividends paid on retained equity, and an equity
redemption alternative. This study concentrates on the evaluation of
different equity redemption alternatives. The primary objective is to
determine the possible improvements Kansas grain marketing and farm supply
cooperatives can make in their equity redemption alternatives.
Specifically this study:
1. Analyzes the present financial structure of Kansas grain
marketing and farm supply cooperatives,
2. Analyzes the present equity redemption policies of Kansas
grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives,
3. Determines a Kansas grain marketing and farm supply
cooperative's patron economic life cycle,
4. Evaluates equity redemption alternatives using selected
evaluation criteria and
5. Recommends superior equity redemption alternatives for local
cooperatives
.
Methodology
To analyze the present financial structure of Kansas grain marketing and
farm supply cooperatives, financial data from the Wichita Bank for
Cooperatives data base is obtained. This data base contains financial
statement data for over 200 Kansas grain marketing and farm supply
cooperatives for 1982 through 1986. Cooperative profiles are generated
from the database based upon various size, solvency, financial strength,
and performance factors. Each factor produces three different cooperative
12
profiles: the top 25 percentile, the middle 50 percentile, and the bottom
25 percentile. These profiles more accurately describe and categorize the
case- study cooperatives and provide for future research on determining
feasible financial plans for cooperatives given their financial structure
and profitability.
A survey is done to determine and analyze the present equity redemption
policies of Kansas grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives. The
survey also asks for the cooperatives' balance sheets, operating
statements, changes in financial position statements, and equity
statements. With this data comparisons of equity redemption policies and
financial strength and structure are made. The cooperative profiles
generated through the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base further
categorize cooperatives according to their equity redemption policies.
It is hypothesized that the financial strength and profitability of a
cooperative is related to the cooperative's equity redemption policy.
To analyze and compare equity redemption alternatives, a patron economic
life cycle is determined. A patron economic life cycle characterizes how
a patron's business evolves during their economic life. A patron economic
life cycle for cooperatives has never been empirically determined, yet it
is essential for the evaluation of equity redemption alternatives when
present value of the cash flow to patrons and proportionality are used as
evaluation criteria. Using Kansas State University's K-MAR 105 data base,
a Kansas grain marketing and farm supply cooperative's patron economic
life cycle is quantified.
Five equity redemption alternatives are analyzed and compared for a
representative, hypothetical cooperative in a steady state situation with
13
the patron economic life cycle. The representative cooperative is further
characterized as one with zero growth and having individual equity
redemption plans in equilibrium (the deferred patronage refund carried on
the balance sheet is constant) . The equity redemption alternatives are
empirically evaluated on how they approximate the basic cooperative
principles of financing in proportion to patronage and operation at cost.
An evaluation is also made on the financial flexibility of the equity
redemption alternatives.
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW
Equity Redemption Alternatives
This study concentrates on the five basic equity redemption
alternatives: estates, age of patron, revolving fund, percentage pool,
and base capital. A brief explanation of these alternatives is given but
for a more in-depth study of equity redemption alternatives refer to
Cobia, Equity Redemption: Issues and Alternatives for Farmer Cooperatives
[Cobia, 1982] and to Barton, Equity Management Alternatives: Investment
and Redemption (Barton, 1988],
The estates equity redemption alternative is so named because redemption
of deferred patronage refunds is dependent on when the heirs of a patron
present the estate for redemption. The estates alternative is one type
of a broader alternative called the specials equity redemption alternative
which is dependent on special situations such as estates, move outs,
bankruptcies, retirements, etc. With the estates alternative, patrons
accumulate deferred patronage refunds during their lifetime from which
they usually receive no direct returns. Cooperatives pay the equity
investment of deceased patrons as an estate to their heirs. Deferred
patronage refunds are obviously of little value to deceased patrons.
Similar to the estates equity redemption alternative, the age of patron
equity redemption alternative also accumulates deferred patronage refunds
over long periods of time. The age of patron alternative redeems patrons
their equity investment in cooperatives when they reach a certain age, say
65. Other common redemption ages are 70, 72, and 75. The advantage of
the alternative over the estates alternative is that patrons receive a
15
redemption of their deferred patronage refunds near their retirement and
before their expected time of death. When this alternative is used, the
deferred patronage refunds patrons accumulate after they have reached the
redemption age are usually redeemed as an estate. The age of patron
alternative is billed as socialistically appealing as a retirement plan.
As with the estates alternative, the age of patron alternative rarely pays
a direct return (dividend on equity)
.
Many grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives in Kansas presently
utilize the age ' of patron equity redemption alternative. The primary
reason is because Farmland Industries, Inc. (the major farm supply
regional cooperative in the state) introduced their Ownership Retirement
Program in 1972 [Farmland Industries, Inc.]. This alternative redeems a
local cooperative's equity investment in Farmland only if the local
redeems a patron's equity due to the age of the patron (65 or older) or
as an estate. The additional cash flow available to locals from Farmland
provided such a strong economic incentive many locals switched from other
equity redemption alternatives such as revolving fund or percentage pool.
The plan also convinced some cooperatives to begin redeeming equity sooner
if they previously used the estate alternative or no alternative. Since
1981, Farmland has not redeemed equity because of reduced earnings. The
regional cooperative's equity redemption alternative is presently under
review. Because of the federated structure of local and regional
cooperatives, a regional 's equity management policies have a major a major
impact on locals.
Another type of equity redemption alternative is the revolving fund.
With the revolving fund alternative, deferred patronage refunds are
16
redeemed to patrons according to the age of the refunds (equity) . For
example, a cooperative on a five year revolving fund alternative redeems
patronage refunds deferred in 1983 if the current year is 1988. The
cooperative is always carrying five years of deferred patronage refunds
on its balance sheet. Even though patrons are not paid returns
(dividends) on their deferred patronage refunds, the refunds are of more
value to patrons since they are generally not held as long by the
cooperative as with the estates and age of patron alternatives. The
percentage pool equity redemption alternative is the simplest alternative
to administer. Cooperatives simply redeem a percentage of the deferred
patronage refunds on the books each year and if there is an equity
redemption, all patrons receive a redemption. The board of directors
usually has total discretion over the percentage that is redeemed. As a
result, the percentage can be varied to meet a target for the pool of
deferred patronage refunds. When cooperatives have a low income year,
their management can choose to redeem a lower percentage since less cash
flow was generated during the year and less was added to the pool.
Naturally, the reverse is also true. The deferred patronage refunds
redeemed by the percentage pool alternative are of greater value the
larger the redemption percentage each year.
The base capital alternative allows cooperatives to automatically follow
the cooperative proportionality principle of financing in proportion to
patronage. With the base capital alternative, cooperative management
decides the amount of deferred patronage refunds they want to carry on
their balance sheet, the base capital target. This implies a patron
target since each patron is then expected to finance the cooperative in
17
proportion to their business as follows:
Financing Requirement - Base Capital Target * Business Proportion
Patrons whose deferred patronage refund balance is greater than the
financing requirement are overinvested. Patrons in the opposite position
are deemed as underinvested. Theoretically, the overinvested patrons are
redeemed their overinvested amount and underinvested member/patrons are
asked to pay in additional capital. However, this is rarely the case.
Normally, overinvested member/patrons receive only a portion of their
rightful redemption and the underinvested member/patrons are allowed to
earn their additional capital through patronage in future years.
The some of the greatest drawbacks of the base capital alternative,
however, are the alternative's complexity and the amount of accounting
data it requires. Let's consider a representative cooperative that is
involved in grain marketing and farm supply. The base capital alternative
requires the cooperative to keep individual patron records to determine
their business proportion. Instead of using only one year to determine
business proportion, a three to five year moving average is generally
used. Thus, the cooperative retains detailed individual patron records
to determine the business proportion moving average. In addition,
cooperatives generally pay patronage refunds in numerous patronage pools.
Patronage pools are different lines of business in which a cooperative is
involved (i.e. marketing wheat, marketing feed grains, selling
fertilizer, selling feed, selling fuel, etc.). An equitable base capital
alternative (one that meets the principle of financing in proportion to
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patronage) does not require a patron who only sold wheat to , cooperatlve
to provide capital for the cooperative's feed .ill. Thus, revenue,
expense, and patronage records and capital requirements are needed for
each patronage pool and a base capital target is needed for each pool.
Since individual patron patronage records are needed for each patronage
pool, a cooperative with five patronage pools and 2000 member/patrons has
its patronage record needs balloon to 10,000. As a result, the base
capital alternative is theoretically very equitable but the alternative
generates a great deal of accounting overhead in practice. A cooperative
with only one patronage pool can use the base capital alternative but the
financing in portion to patronage principle is largely thwarted.
In Chapter III, the estates, age of patron, revolving fund, percentage
pool and base capital equity redemption alternatives are evaluated on
three criteria: financial flexibility, proportionality and present value
of cash flow. The following work is examined to determine the
relationship between it and this study.
Previous Equity Rerf.mption Si,r™v«
In 1957, Manuel reports on the results of the field interviews of 343
Kansas local cooperatives in 1950. Manuel proposes that many of these
cooperatives are losing their cooperative nature since profits are being
accrued to the organizations instead of patrons. To quantify his
proposal, Manuel uses a percentage of all patrons who are active and
regularly patronizing the cooperative. Two thirds of the cooperatives
report that 80 percent or more of their patrons are active which Manuel
considers to be acceptable. However, Manuel also finds that only 10
percent of all the cooperatives in Kansas report having an equity
19
redemption alternative. The results of this study suggest that the
cooperatives in Manuel's study have a small percentage of their equity
investment in proportion to their patronage in 1950. In addition, the
value of patronage refunds to most patrons in Kansas in 1950 is very low
since their estates are not even redeemed [Manuel, pp. 11-15].
Instead of field interviews, Newman mails a questionnaire to managers
of all 241 grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives in Kansas in 1981.
Overall, Newman achieves a 45 percent response rate to either the initial
survey or a telephone follow-up and 37 percent provide financial data.
Newman determines that Kansas local cooperatives have made important
strides toward the development of equity redemption alternatives to
maintain ownership by current users. This study reports that 24 percent
of Kansas local cooperatives are using the specials equity redemption
alternative, 64 percent are using the age of patron alternative and 23
percent are using the revolving fund alternative in 1981. Newman
concludes that there are no strong differences in proportionality between
cooperatives with the revolving fund and the age of patron alternatives.
However, he also concludes that cooperatives using the revolving fund
alternative are significantly stronger financially than others using only
the specials or the age of patron equity redemption alternative. This
might be due to the fact that the revolving fund alternative cooperatives
can afford this equity redemption alternative and the other cooperatives
can not afford this systematic alternative [Newman, AFR, 1983, pp. 41-49].
Newman's study also suggests that the equity redemption practices of
Kansas local cooperatives has significantly improved from 1950 to 1981.
Nationally, the most recent survey on equity redemption practices is
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done by Brown and Volkin in 1974 although the Agricultural Cooperative
Service has an extensive national cooperative survey in progress but
results are not available. Brown and Volkin find that only 71 percent of
all cooperatives have some type of equity redemption alternative. Of the
cooperatives having equity redemption alternatives, 17 percent are using
only systematic alternatives (revolving fund, percentage pool or base
capital), 55 percent are using only nonsystematic alternatives (specials
or age of patron) and 28 percent are using a combination of systematic and
nonsystematic alternatives [Brown & Volkin, p. 5].
From Brown and Volkin' s national survey and Newman's Kansas survey,
Kansas local grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives have better
overall equity redemption policies than the national average. Still it
is questionable how well Kansas local cooperatives are following basic
cooperative principles and practices with their present equity redemption
policies since the majority of these policies hold equity for long periods
of time before redemption.
Cooperative Financial Models and Evaluation of Equity Redemption
Alternatives
This section reviews previous work on cooperative financial models and
on the evaluation of equity redemption alternatives. Cooperative
financial models are usually developed to analyze some aspect of equity
management in cooperatives which may or may not include examination of
equity redemption alternatives. The selected work in this review is
generally cited by most authors of cooperative equity management work.
For additional references, Fischer does a very comprehensive and thorough
literature review [Fischer, pp. 15-96],
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Tubbs investigates the impacts of alternative cooperative financial
policies on terminal net worth of patrons (the cooperative is considered
an integral part of patrons' agricultural operations). In general, Tubbs
argues that cooperatives should be financed so patron financial sacrifice
is minimal. "What if members were allowed to invest in accordance with
their willingness?" Besides going against the principle of proportional
financing, Tubbs suggests that a large part of the ownership of a
cooperative be from sources other than the patrons. Using a farm
simulation, he investigates different types of financing and the resulting
terminal net worth of patrons [Tubbs, 1971] . If cooperatives rely heavily
on capital from sources other than from member/patrons, these outside
sources are going to also demand control. The result Is an investor owned
firm and patrons lose the advantages of a cooperative
.
Fenwick is the first to employ linear programming to determine the
optimal financial structure for cooperatives with the work concentrating
on Missouri local cooperatives . Examining only the revolving fund
alternative, Fenwick determines that cooperatives characterized by long
revolving periods could effectively utilize debt capital and leases to
finance expansion and concurrently reduce their revolving period. Like
this study, he argues that shorter revolving periods increase the value
of deferred patronage refunds to member/patrons. However, Fenwick
includes in his model market growth of the cooperative and it is not clear
how his results are affected by this growth. Many Kansas local
cooperatives can now only grow through consolidation with and acquisition
of other cooperatives. It is questionable whether this type of growth can
generate Fenwick' s results since some economies of scale are experienced
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but market position and dominance are not changed. Fenwick also
determines that the minimum cost of capital associated with deferred
patronage refunds represents the price that patrons are willing to pay to
maintain competition in the market via their cooperative [Fenwick, 1972].
In contrast, Wilson argues that the capital cost of deferred patronage
refunds is equal to the benefits patrons could have realized from
investments outside of the cooperative (patrons' opportunity cost of
capital) . He carries this idea one step further in his simulations by
requiring that interest payments on all forms of patron equity capital
have first claim on profits. Wilson's rationale for this is to compensate
for disproportionalities between investments and patronage and make
cooperative management account for the opportunity cost of patrons'
deferred patronage in making financial decisions. Wilson bases these
proposals on the results he obtains from a simulation model designed to
evaluate financial alternatives over a ten year planning period [Wilson,
1974].
Using recursive linear programming models, Dahl and Dobson seek to
determine optimal (least costly) financial structures for Wisconsin local
farm supply cooperatives. Their study includes only the revolving fund
alternative. Dahl and Dobson conclude that more permanent equity capital
(e.g., preferred and common stock), more certificates of indebtedness
capital and substantially less deferred patronage refund capital should
be used by Wisconsin local farm supply cooperatives. Capital cost
reductions in the neighborhood of seven to nine percent are found to be
feasible for the cooperatives in their sample. It is not clear how this
saving is incurred since Dahl and Dobson' s recommendations simply changes
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the form of equity capital. Since the patron opportunity cost of capital
is the same whether the equity capital is held by cooperatives in the form
of deferred patronage refunds or common stock, this makes no difference
in the cooperative cost of capital [Dahl & Dobson, 1976, pp. 198-208].
The major objective of Cook's thesis is to construct a general framework
by which to describe, analyze and remedy the farmer cooperative patron
equity redemption problem. Naturally, part of this objective is an
evaluation of equity redemption alternatives. Cook uses a modified
version of Wilson's cooperative simulator to evaluate equity redemption
alternatives. Although Cook deemed his equity redemption alternatives as
traditional, they are not. Basically, Cook evaluates a specials
alternative, a percentage pool alternative and two versions of a revolving
fund alternative. Cook has no patron based evaluation criteria but uses
financial ratios as the "impact measurement device." The financial ratios
include the current ratio, the fixed assets to equity ratio, the current
debt to equity ratio, the total debt to equity ratio, sales to equity
ratio, sales to working capital ratio, net savings to equity ratio and net
savings to sales ratio. Cook does not mention how the collective changes
in these ratios measure the impact of the different equity redemption
alternatives except that they are individually compared against the
industry average. Cook's evaluation is obviously very subjective since
he determines when his impact measurement device (financial ratios)
rejects an equity redemption alternative. Cook proposes a somewhat useful
if not rigorous 25 step guideline for developing an equity redemption
alternative for a cooperative [Cook, 1976]
.
Hodges evaluates seven equity redemption plans for a representative
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Oklahoma local cooperative which include variations and combinations of
the specials , age of patron and revolving fund alternatives with a
computerized simulator. Hodges is one of the first to evaluate equity
redemption alternatives in the context of a representative patron equity
investment structure and business activity pattern. Patron activity is
modified based on estimates of patron exit, including mortality,
retirement from farming, switching to a competitor and moving or quitting
business and new patron entry. In addition, patron business volume by age
is adjusted by estimated trends. However, all estimates of member/patron
economic activity except mortality rates are derived from management
judgement, not empirical analyses. Hodges' equity redemption alternative
evaluation criteria include a coefficient of equity-age, the average age
of the membership, the distribution of equities within age groups and the
value of equities held by inactive member/patrons and estates. A complete
comparative analysis using the evaluation criteria of the seven equity
redemption alternatives is not done by Hodges [Hodges, 1976].
A deterministic simulation model for evaluating the financial
alternatives available to cooperatives is developed by Beierlein. The
simulator examines ten different patron groups and determines the value
of cash flow to the patron groups over a 20 year planning horizon.
Besides his other findings on cooperative capital structure, Beierlein
finds that equity redemption practices often benefit one patron group at
the expense of another group and seldom are all patron groups benefitted
simultaneously. Beierlein does not build on his finding and determine if
the gains outweigh the losses and if the losers can be compensated
[Beierlein, 1977].
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Using Beierlein' s simulator, Beierlein and Schrader investigate the
present value of cash flow to patrons for the following situations: 1)
cooperatives are required to pay a return on all forms of member/patron
equity capital, 2) cooperatives are required to pay a large percentage of
patronage refunds in cash, and 3) limiting the length of the revolving
fund. Beierlein and Schrader find in the first two situations that the
present value of cash flow to patrons actually decrease and in the third
situation there was a negligible increase in the present value of cash
flow to patrons. Fischer offers some explanations for these findings but
a key factor in Beierlein and Schrader' s findings is their cooperative
return on assets assumption versus their patrons' opportunity cost. By
reevaluating these two assumptions, Beierlein and Schrader' s findings
could easily find that all three situations generate significantly higher
present values of cash flows to patrons [Beierlein & Schrader, 1978, pp.
638-641].
Royer investigates the possible impacts of legislation that would
require cooperatives to 1) pay interest or dividends on deferred patronage
refunds, 2) retire deferred patronage refunds within a certain time, or
3) a combination of 1) and 2). Using a deterministic simulator, Royer
concludes that mandatory equity redemption policies (situations 1), 2) and
3)) would primarily reduce the financial flexibility of cooperatives.
Royer argues that the loss in flexibility is due to the fact that
mandatory equity redemption policies require additional cash flow and that
cooperatives (like any business) have a limited amount of cash flow
[Royer, 1983, pp. 30-40].
An excellent study on the financing of agricultural cooperatives is done
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by Fischer. Fischer addresses how cooperatives should be ideally
financed, how cooperatives are financed in practice and what accounts for
any discrepancies between theory and realism. To determine the
theoretical issue, Fischer develops a theoretical framework for
identifying the cost of capital to cooperatives. He finds that
cooperatives should ideally be financed by debt instead of patron equity.
Fischer admits that he does not consider risk but that the results would
be similar. In practice, Fischer finds that cooperatives are generally
financed by patron equity instead of debt. Fischer argues that this
discrepancy is due to the control of cooperatives by the management
(executive) staff of cooperatives instead of the members. He goes further
in his explanation by stating that cooperative management views patron
equity as zero cost capital and asserts that this leads to overinvestment
in assets, overexpansion and investment in assets with a low return.
However, he does not consider how control of cooperatives would change
with primary capitalization from debt. Fischer develops a simulator to
substantiate his theoretical findings and finds that cooperatives should
be financed 50 to 67 percent by debt . His is the first simulator to
consider the interdependence between a cooperative's financial policy and
its sales, return on assets, cost of member/patrons' equity and profits
[Fischer, 1984].
The most similar study to this analysis and comparison of equity
redemption alternatives is Royer and Cobia's study. In Chapter III, a
relationship is built on the similarities between the two studies. A
short review of the Royer and Cobia study is given here. Royer and
Cobia's study is the first to compare the simulated performance of
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alternative equity redemption alternatives. Royer and Cobia examines the
revolving fund alternative, the percentage pool alternative (Percentage-
of-All-Equities) and the specials alternative. Royer and Cobia consider
the specials alternative to include both our definition of the estates
alternative and the age of patron alternative. For an evaluation
criterion, they develop a disparity index that measures the degree to
which a cooperative is not proportionately financed. They do not use the
present value of member/patron cash flows. Although Royer and Cobia find
that equity redemption alternative performance depends largely on patron
histories of patronage and equity investment, they determine that the
revolving fund alternative with low revolving periods (up to 5 years)
usually has the lowest disparity index values [Royer & Cobia, 1984, pp.
105-112].
In summary, the area of cooperative finance and cooperative equity
management in particular is ripe for further research despite the fine
work that has been done previously. In Chapter II, the present financial
condition and equity redemption situation for Kansas local cooperatives
is analyzed. In addition, the concept of a patron economic life cycle is
developed. This study's analysis and comparison of equity redemption
alternatives in a hypothetical, representative environment utilizes the
patron economic life cycle. These findings are presented in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER II. ANALYSIS OF KANSAS LOCAL COOPERATIVES
A. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF KANSAS LOCAL COOPERATIVES
Wichita Bank for Cooperatives Data Base
To determine the financial condition of Kansas local grain marketing and
farm supply cooperatives, financial data from the Ninth Farm Credit
District, Wichita Bank for Cooperatives is obtained. Jack E. Doyle,
Credit Support Manager of the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives, prepared a
report that summarizes the financial trends of local cooperatives in the
Ninth Farm Credit District (Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado and New Mexico)
[Doyle, 1987]. After examining this report, however, further work is
needed since Doyle did not segment the local cooperative population as
desired. Kansas local grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives are
not presented as a group and some of the comparative data is missing and
needs to be calculated. In addition, this study needs to sort the Kansas
local cooperatives by some key financial ratios.
Based upon this information, the information is acquired from the
Wichita Bank for Cooperatives and analyzed in-house. This study contains
all of the Kansas local grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives in
the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives' data base for the fiscal year ends 1982
through 1986.
Procedures for Determining Financial Condition
After checking the data to make sure that it was complete and accurate,
a new data base is created. The new data base contains only Kansas local
grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives that have been in the Wichita
Bank for Cooperatives' data base for each year: 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and
1986. This produces a homogeneous sample of 201 cooperatives that is
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compared from year to year to determine trends.
The data received from the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives contains only
financial statement data and no financial ratios are supplied. Table
2.A.1 lists the financial statement numbers and financial ratios that are
not supplied but calculated. One of the key aspects of equity management
is the cash patronage percentage. The cash patronage percentage is the
percentage of current patronage refunds that is paid to member/patrons in
cash. The data supplied by the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives does not
contain current patronage refunds, the item needed to calculate cash
patronage percentage ((cash patronage refund) / (current patronage
refunds)). Since the cooperatives in this study's data base are
continuous for the five years, data is used from previous years to
calculate current retained earnings ({present year's R/E) - (previous
year's R/E)) which in turn is used to calculate current patronage refunds
((net earnings) - (current retained earnings)). For 1982, a cash
patronage percentage is not figured because the data base does not contain
retained earnings data for 1981.
There are two prominent sources of error in the data base. First, error
is introduced in the calculation of the cash patronage percentage from the
possibility of cooperatives having equity transfers into and out of
retained earnings. This error is minimal and limited to the cash
patronage percentage and its related financial data. The second source
of error in the data base is from inconsistent data entry. Each loan
officer at the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives is in charge of entering the
financial data from their own account cooperatives. The loan officers use
their own discretion on the data that is entered. This causes two types
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Table 2.A.I. Additional Calculations on Wichita Bank for Coop. Data.
Financial Data
Net Earnings
Current Retained Earnings
Current Patronage Refunds
Solvency Ratios
Ownership
Long-Term Debt / Member Equity (L-T Debt/Mem. Equity)
Member Equity / Net Fixed Investments (Mem. Equity/NFI)
Liquidity Ratios
Working Capital / Total Assets (WC/TA)
Current Ratio
Profitability Ratios
Local Earnings / Local Assets (LE/LA)
Local Earnings / Total Assets (LE/TA)
Earnings Before Taxes / Local Assets (EBT/LA)
Earnings Before Taxes / Total Assets (EBT/TA)
Net Earnings / Local Assets (NE/LA)
Net Earnings / Total Assets (NE/TA)
Equity Redemption Performance Measures
Cash Patronage Percentage (Cash Patronage %)
Equity Redemption / Allocated Equity (ER/AE)
Equity Redemption / Total Member Equity (ER/ME)
Cash Flow to Patrons
Cash Flow to Patrons / Allocated Equity (CFP/AE)
Cash Flow to Patrons / Total Member Equity (CFP/ME)
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of problems. First, the loan officers might input only totals (i.e.,
total sales) and not the totals' individual components (i.e., total grain
sales and total farm supply sales). Second, the financial statements and
accounting practices of cooperatives are far from uniform. For example,
some cooperatives refer to deferred patronage refunds as "common stock"
(wrong terminology) whereas most cooperatives refer to these funds as
"revolving fund" or "deferred patronage refunds" (more correct
terminology). Thus, it is up to each loan officer to interpret the
information. This study acknowledges this possibility of error and
concentrates on the major components of the financial statements to avoid
it. The major components of the data base are reconcilable. In addition,
any missing values in the data are considered to have a value of zero.
Seventeen financial ratios are presented in Table 2.A.1 and are
calculated to determine the financial trends of Kansas local grain
marketing and farm supply cooperatives from 1982 to 1986. Eleven of the
ratios track the traditional financial measures of solvency, liquidity and
profitability. The six remaining financial ratios are designed to measure
the equity redemption performance of cooperatives. Increases in the
equity redemption performance measures indicate that cooperatives are
approaching operation within the guidelines of basic cooperative
principles.
For 1986, the data base is sorted on each of the 17 financial ratios.
After each sort, the data base is split into three groups: top, middle and
bottom groups. The top group contains the 50 cooperatives (approximately
25 percent) with the highest financial ratios for a given sort. The
middle group contains the 101 cooperatives (approximately 50 percent) with
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the next highest financial ratios for a given sort and the bottom group
contains the remaining 50 cooperatives (approximately 25 percent) with the
lowest financial ratios for a given sort. By segmenting the data base
into these groups, the cooperatives are better able to be categorized and
identification of their possible problems and probable solutions is
facilitated. The financial structures and practices that enhance equity
redemption performance and those that are detrimental to equity redemption
performance are also able to be identified.
In the literature review, Royer concludes that equity redemption
performance is largely dependent on available cash flow (generated by
profits) and Fischer and others consider financial structure (ownership
or amount of member/patron equity financing) a crucial determinant of
equity redemption performance. As a result, the data base is sorted
simultaneously on ownership and profitability and the results are
segmented into a three by three matrix described later in this section.
Financial Profile s of Kansas Local Cooperatives
To determine the financial trends for Kansas local grain marketing and
farm supply cooperatives, the average financial statements from 1982 to
1986 are examined. A further analysis of these cooperatives' equity
redemption performances is done using sorts on ownership and local
earnings return on local assets. Finally, financial profile matrix is
developed based on ownership and local earnings return on local assets and
differences in the equity redemption performance of the matrix's nine
cells are identified.
The total assets in table 2. A. 2 show a general decline of $155,000 from
1982 to 1986. The decline in total assets was in large part due to a
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Table 2. A. 2. Kansas Local Cooperative Average Balance Sheet.
Fiscal Year
Account 1382 1983 19B4 19B3 laoo
Total Current Assets 1,550,191 1.520,189 1,576,685 1,436,233 1,403,043
Investments 762,595 786.565 832,737 824,187 733,416
Property, Plant, and
Equipment 1,082,315 1,118,908 1,126,675 1,102,558 1,096,156
Other Assets 18.481 19,566 24,813 24,925 26,463
Total Assets 3.413,581 3.445,227 3,560,909 3,387.903 3,259,078
Total Current
Liabilities 1.042.611 1,015,071 1,051.126 917,837 869,233
Totsl Term Debt 442,686 438,134 470,324 428,914 364,397
Total Liabilities 1.485,297 1.453,205 1,521,450 1,346,751 1,233,630
Allocated Equity 1,472,876 1,565,501 1,594.393 1,614,271 1,578,332
Retained Earnings 455,408 426,520 445,066 426,881 447,116
Total Member's Equity 1,928,284 1.992,021 2,039,459 2,041,152 2,025,448
Total Liabilities and
Member's Equity 3,413.581 3,445,227 3,560,909 3,387,903 3,259,078
34
$147,000 decrease in total current assets. Although the data Is not shown
on table 2. A. 2, the decrease In total current assets is attributed to an
$81,000 decline in accounts receivable, an $85,000 decline in grain
inventory and a $143,000 decline in supply inventory. Meanwhile, cash and
short-term investments increase $193,000. Investments and net fixed
assets demonstrate increases until 1984 and then fall to 1982 levels in
1986. The 1985 and 1986 decreases are connected to Farmland Industries,
Inc. (Kansas local cooperatives' regional farm supply cooperative) stock
write-down.
Naturally, total liabilities and equities also demonstrate a $155,000
decline. Total current liabilities remain steady through 1984 and then
experience a $182,000 decline in 1985 and 1986. Much of the total current
liabilities decline in 1985 and 1986 is attributed to a $224,000 decrease
in current notes payable. However, the other current liabilities account
increases $64,000 during 1985 and 1986. A $79,000 decline in total term
debt also contributes to the total liabilities decline and is driven by
decreases in the Bank for Cooperatives term debt. In contrast, total
member equity remains relatively constant from 1982 to 1986 with a
moderate $10,000 increase. The Farmland Industries, Inc. stock write-down
is partly responsible for the only moderate increase in total member
equity since the operating statement shows healthy earnings.
Earnings are healthy in table 2. A. 3 but total sales decline $2,059,000
(25 percent) from a 1984 high to a 1986 low. A $1,538,000 decrease in
total grain sales is largely responsible for the decline in total sales.
However, the total sales decline is misleading since cooperative earnings
are margin driven. In addition, the decline in total sales can be due in
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Table 2. A. 3. Kansas Local Cooperative Average Operating Statement and Working Capital.
Operating Statei
Fi!*csi Year
Account 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
8,161,725 8,019,771 8 .307,710 7,558,339 6,248,826
Total Gross Margins 636,949 634,559 652,937 624 , 103 563.306
445,659 482,837 463,992 500,868 590,842
1,082,607 1,117,396 1 ,116,929 1,124,971 1,154,148
973,261 975,383 1 ,002,220 1,037,587 996,980
Total Local Savings 109,346 142,013 114,709 87,385 157,168
Patronage Income 51,295 22,960 28,426 34,457
Other Non-operating
1,520 2,193 (2,849) (29,809)
Non-recurring Items (8,267)
Total Net Savings
162,162 167,167 140,287 92,033
Less: Income Taxes 2.757 3,351 3,213 3,127 5,591
Net Earnings 159,405 163,816 137,074 88,906 82,175
Current Patronage
Refunds NA 192,703 118,528 107,091
Current Retained
Earnings NA (28,887) 18,546 (18,185) 20,235
Working Capital
Fiscal Year
Account 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total Funds Provided
Total Equity Redemptions
Total Funds Applied
393,525
50,839
397,948
420,959
52,726
422,312
433,643
52,007
412,070
327.227
58,963
334,231
395,408
62,045
378,468
Total Change in Working
Capital (4,424) (1,354) 21,573 (7,004) 16,940
Beginning Working
Capital 512,003 506,471 504,051 525,401 516,583
Ending Working Capital 507,579 505,117 525,624 518,397 533,523
36
part to declines In volumes or prices. Thus, total gross margins,
affected by volumes and unit margins are also in need of being examined.
Similar to total sales, total gross margins are highest in 1984 and
demonstrate a $90,000 (only 14 percent) decrease to a low in 1986 with
corresponding $30,000 and $37,000 declines in grain gross margins and
supply gross margins, respectively. A $145,000 increase in total other
income more than offsets the decline in total gross margins. Of the total
other income components, storage and handling income demonstrate the most
significant increase of $118,000 much of which came from government
storage payments. The net effect of these trends is a moderate increase
in total gross income of $71,000.
Total expenses are approximately the same in 1982 and 1983, jump up
$27,000 in 1984 and another $36,000 1985 and then declined $41,000 in 1986
due to declines in fixed expenses. Total local earnings is likewise quite
volatile with a low in 1985 due to increases in total expenses and a high
in 1986 with $70,000 increase due to a decline in total expenses and an
increase in total gross income. Because of regional cooperative losses
and stock write-downs, this study concentrates on total local earnings to
measure Kansas local cooperatives' profitability. However, it is
interesting to note the affect of regional cooperatives on Kansas local
cooperatives. In 1982 ,1983 and 1984, patronage income (income from
regional cooperatives) substantially increase net earnings. Regional
cooperative losses in 1985 and 1986 substantially reduce net earnings.
Working capital demonstrates a relatively steady $22,000 increase from
1982 to 1986. However, the total funds provided and total funds applied
show greater variability. 1982 and 1986 provide similar amounts of funds
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and 1983 and 1984 provided $26,000 and $39,000 more, respectively. Due
to low earnings in 1985, $68,000 less funds are provided than in 1986.
The total funds applied follow a similar pattern with 1984 and 1986
applying significantly less funds than are provided.
In table 2.A.4, Kansas local cooperatives are increasing their financial
solvency during the 1982 to 1986. The ownership ratio makes a steady,
significant
.04 increase from
.58 to .63. This compares to a national
ownership ratio average of .43 in 1985 [USDA, Farmer r^.H.
Statistic, P. 22] and Brown and Volkin give Kansas local cooperatives a
rating of excellent on their ownership ratio [Brown & Volkin, p. 16). i„
turn, the long-term debt/total member equity ratio declines from .24 to
.22. Kansas local cooperatives also improve upon their healthy liquidity
position by increasing their current ratio from 1.96 in 1982 to 2.13 in
1986. Brown and Volkin again rank Kansas local cooperatives as excellent
with their 1986 current ratio [Brown & Volkin, p. 13] . The most
representative profitability ratio for Kansas local cooperatives is the
local earnings/total assets ratio. This ratio demonstrates most clearly
the performance of the management staff of local cooperatives since
regional earnings (patronage income) and assets (investments) are not
included in the ratio. The local earnings/total assets ratio is
approximately the same in 1982 and 1984 at .037 and
.036. respectively.
In 1984, the ratio jumps to .049 and it jumps even higher to .053 in 1986.
In 1985, excessive expenses decrease the ratio to a low of .02.
The equity redemption performance measures show a slight but general
decline in the equity redemption performance of Kansas local cooperatives.
First, the cash patronage percentage declines 5.5 points to a low of 16.4
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Table 2. A.*. Kansas Local Cooperative Average Financial Ratios and Equity Redemption
Performance Measures.
Fiscal Year
Item 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Solvency Ratios
Ownership .590 .599 .593 .614 .631
L-T Debt/Mem. Equity .239 .231 .252 .234 .224
Mem. Equity/HFI 2.134 2.123 2.116 2.180 2.174
Liouidttv Ratios
WC/TA .163 .157 .156 .157 . 167
Currant Ratio 1.96 1 99 2.06 2.19 2. 13
Profitability Ratios
LE/LA 037 .049 .036 020 .053
LE/TA 031 .039 .029 .019 ,042
EBI/LA .060 .059 .048 .023 .016
EBI/TA .047 .047 .038 .021 .016
HE/LA .059 058 047 .022 .015
BE/IA .047 .046 .037 ,020 .015
Eouity Redenrotion
Performance Measures
NA 21.91 18.44 20.63Cash Patronage I 16.38
ER/AE 031 .029 .029 .030 .035
ER/ME .022 .022 .021 .023 .026
Cash Flow to Patrons $97,872 8100,231 691,609 S96.085 693,219
CFP/AE .060 .055 .051 .049 .052
CFP/ME .042 .041 .037 ,037 .038
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percent in 1986. In addition, cash flow to patrons declines $7,000 from
a $100,000 high In 1983 to $93,000 in 1986. This decline is due to
changes in cash patronage refunds since the equity redemption/allocated
equity ratio (allocated equity turnover ratio) demonstrates relatively
steady strength. In fact, the ratio reaches a high of .035 in 1986. This
is considered a relatively poor equity redemption performance. The .035
allocated equity turnover ratio means that Kansas local cooperatives are
using approximately a 29 year revolving fund equity redemption alternative
or approximately a 3.5 percent percentage pool alternative. From the
previous studies alone, this type of equity redemption performance does
not allow cooperatives to follow basic cooperative principles. Since
allocated equity contains common stock, preferred stock (both not subject
to a redemption until an estate is presented) and deferred patronage
refunds (redeemable), the allocated equity turnover ratio is aggravated
downward. This explains in part the low level of the allocated equity
turnover ratio.
Following Fischer's (ownership ratio) and Royer's (profitability)
studies, the data base is sorted on the ownership ratio and the local
earnings/local assets ratio to determine if these have any affect on
equity redemption performance. As the ownership ratio declines in table
2. A. 5 so do all of the equity redemption performance measures. However,
this is not to say that a cooperative with a high ownership ratio will
automatically have high equity redemption performance measures. Instead,
before cooperatives can tackle their equity redemption problem they must
first have a strong balance sheet which comes from profitability. The
local earnings/total assets ratios demonstrate in Table 2. A. 5 that high
40
TabLe 2. A. 5. Kansas Local Cooperative Ownership Stratification Working Capital and Financial
Ratios.
Working Capital
Total Funds Provided
Total Equity Redemptions
Total Funds Applied
Total Change in Working
Capital
Beginning Working Capital
Ending Working Capital
Ownership
High
251
Medium
521
Low
25;
407,058
99,090
409,722
422,662
61.283
375,381
328,705
26,541
353,449
(2,664)
L 936,954
934,290
47,281
457,461
504,742
(24,744)
215,637
190,694
Financial Ratios
Ownership
High Medium Low
Item ISA 50Z 251
Solvency Ratio
Ownership .825 .636
Liauiditv Ratio
Current Ratio 3.75
Profitability Ratios
LE/LA .093 .057 .005
EBT/TA .058 .019 (.031)
HE/TA .056 .017 (.032)
Equity Redemption
performance Measures
Cash Patronage Z 25.41 16.20 7.70
ER/AE .049 .037 .018
ER/ME .034 .027 .016
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ownership cooperatives are self financing because they generate enough
profit to finance the cooperative without significant amounts of debt.
The current ratio and working capital numbers demonstrate that higher
ownership cooperatives also have more cash flow available for equity
redemption. Although the high ownership cooperatives actually generate
less cash flow than the medium ownership cooperatives, they feel
comfortable enough with their working capital amount to redeem more
equity.
From table 2. A. 6, no great difference is determinable between the groups
in how assets are invested. Nor is there any difference in the amount of
total assets (size) of the cooperatives between the groups. On the
liabilities side of the balance sheet, there are large differences since
the data base is sorted on the ownership ratio. The data base
cooperatives generate large increases in liabilities and especially total
current liabilities as ownership is decreased. On the operating
statement, total sales actually increase as ownership decreases. The same
is generally true of total gross income as it increases moderately as
lower ownership groups are encountered. The greatest difference on the
operating statement is in total expenses which increase significantly with
the lower ownership groups. It appears that the high ownership
cooperatives are managed more efficiently since approximately the same
total gross income is generated with lower sales and lower total expenses.
Table 2. A. 7 The relationship between cooperative profitability (local
earnings/local assets) and equity redemption performance is evident in
table 2. A. 7. Similar to the ownership stratification, the profitability
stratification demonstrates that all of the equity redemption performance
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Table 2. A. 6.
Balance Sheet
Kansas Local Cooperative Ownership Stratification Balance Sheet and Operating
Statement.
Ownership
High Medium Low
Account 251 501 251
Total Current Assets 1,,396,398 1,316,638 1,582,228
Investments 740,128 688,543 817,347
Property, Plant, and
Equipment 1,.126,802 1,083,677 1,090,718
Other Assets
3
21,283
,286,610
27,254 30,045
Total Assets 3,116,113 3,520,337
Total Current
Liabilities 462,954 811,896 1,391,334
Total Term Debt 117,861 329,463 681,499
Total Liabilities 580,815 1,141,359 2,072,833
Allocated Equity 2 ,015,636 1,530,456 1,237.737
Retained Earnings 690,159 444,298 209.767
Total Member's Equity 2 ,705,795 1,974,753 1,447,504
Total Liabilities and
Member's Equity 3 ,286,610 3,116,113 3,520,337
Operatinjt Statement
Ownershin
High Medium Low
Account 251 501 25X
Total Sales 6 ,011,742 6,076,975 6,833,048
Total Gross Margins 581.016 540,325 592,017
Total Other Income 552,013 624,000 562,692
Total Gross Income 1 ,133,030 1,164,325 1,154,709
Total Expenses 898,871 993,410 1,102,298
Total Local Savings 234,158 170,915 52,411
Patronage Income 14,100 17,416 19,239
Other Non-operating
Income (46,200) (77,133) (112,276)
Non-recurring Items (10,006) (13,020)
Total Net Savings Before
Taxes 202,059 101,191 (53,647)
Less: Income Taxes 7,631 6,625 1,461
Net Earnings 194,427 94,566 (55,108)
Current Patronage Refunds 140,318 66,855 (26,367)
Current Retained Earnings 54,109 27,711 (28,741)
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Table 2. A, 7. Kansas Local Coop.rat.ive Profitability Stratification Working Capital and
Financial Ratios.
Working Capital
Total Funds Provided
Total Equity Redemptions
Total Funds Applied
High
251
604,115
127,973
530,068
Total Change in Working
Capital 74,047
Beginning Working Capital 707,974
Ending Working Capital 782,022
Profitability
Medium
501
409,138
49,355
395,732
13,406
529,199
542,505
Low
25Z
158,967
21,753
191,995
(33,028)
299,708
266,679
Financial Ratios
Profitability
Item
High
251
Medium
50j
Low
25?
Solvency Ratio
Ownership
.727 .622 .553
Liquidity Ratio
Current Ratio 2.57 2.14 1.68
Profitability Ratios
LE/LA
EBT/TA
NE/IA
.140
.086
.082
.057
.016
.016
(.043)
(.055)
(.054)
Eouitv Redemution
Performance Measures
Cash Patronage X
ER/AE
ER/ME
33.55
.063
.04*
16.32
.029
.022
(0.07)
.019
.016
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measures decline as profitability declines. In addition, the ownership
ratio is directly related to profitability. Cash flow and working capital
are also directly related to profitability. This is expected since cash
flow is generated by earnings and cash flow provides for additional
working capital. These results show that Royer's conclusions that equity
redemption performance is dependent on profitability are correct. In
table 2. A. 8, cooperative profitability shows economies of scale since the
high profitability group have average assets totaling $3.6 million and the
low profitability group have average assets totaling only $2.5 million.
The high profitability group expresses its greater efficiency through its
10 percent gross margin percentage (total gross margins / total sales).
The medium and low profitability groups have a nine percent and eight
percent gross margin percentage, respectively. The high profitability
group is also more efficient with its expense to gross income percentage
of 73 percent while the medium and low profitability groups have expense
to gross income percentages of 87 percent and 107 percent, respectively.
It is assumed that the efficiency differences are due to both economies
of scale and the management staff of the respective cooperatives.
The individual stratification of cooperatives by ownership and
profitability ratios demonstrates that equity redemption performance is
related to both of these financial measures. In addition, ownership and
profitability are shown to be related. As a result, a cross
stratification of the data base on the 1986 year to create a cooperative
financial profile matrix. Table 2. A. 9 presents the results of the cross
stratification. The first number in each of the matrix's nine cells
denotes the number of cooperatives in that cell. The second number in
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Table 2. A. 8. Kansas Local Cooperative Profitability Stratification Balance Sheet and
Operating Statement.
Balance Sheet
Profitability
Account
Total Current Assets
investments
Bigh
251
1,630,641
755,044
Medium
50 Z
1,459,093
758.576
low
25J
1,062,226
658,961
Property, Plant, end
Equipment
Other Assets
1.258,943
12,657
1,171,826
33,910
780,517
25,227
Total Assets 3,657,284 3,424,395 2,526,931
Total Current
Liabilities
Total Terra Debt
848,619
176,448
915,917
446,173
795,547
387,159
Total Liabilities 1,025,067 1,362,090 1,182,706
Allocated Equity
Retained Earnings
1,967,387
664,831
1,588,431
473,875
1,168,876
175,350
Total Member's Equity
Total Liabilities and
Member's Equity
High Medium Low
Account 251 501 251
Total Sales 6,866,960 6 ,795.893 4,525,616
Total Gross Margins 660,608 606,662 378,424
Total Other Income 738,349 578,543 468,178
Total Gross Income 1,398,957 1 ,185,205 846,602
Total Expenses 1,016,911 1 ,032,985 904,317
Total Local Savings 382,047 152,220 (57,714)
Patronage Income 13,210 20,092 14,723
Other Non-operating
Income (95,820) (85,860) (45,027)
Non-recurring Items (4.43B) (5,318) (18,052)
Total Net Savings Before
294,998 77,515 (98,760)
Less: Income Taxes 16,333 3.269 (461)
Net Earnings 278,665 74,246 (98,299)
Current Patronage Refunds 216,855 23,621 (15,571)
Current Retained Earnings 61.810 50 , 625 (82,728)
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Table 2. A. 9. Kansas Local Cooperative Ownership and Profitability Cross Stratification.
Ownership I
Local
EaminRs
Local
Assets
22
83.35
92.91 - 76.50
15.29
35.13 - 10.11
22
82.39
96.79 - 74.68
6.21
9.15 - 2.23
79.71
89.27 - 75.69
(1.74)
0.01 - (6.47)
Medium
27
64.96
74.52 - 55.15
13.00
20.82 - 9.73
53
62.98
73.71 - 54.34
5.67
9.32 - 1.67
21
63.62
74.56 - 55.69
(3.61)
1.66 - (13.38)
46.52
46.52 - 46.52
11.55
11.55 - 11.55
26
43.67
54.02 - 17.97
5.44
9.48 - 2.65
23
41.29
53.00 - 26.12
(5.52)
1.64 - (24.69)
# of Coop.
Ownership Z
Ownership Range
Profitability
Profit. Range
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each cell gives the average ownership ratio for the cooperatives
represented by that cell while the third line states the range of
ownership ratios in that cell. The fourth line in each cell gives the
average local earning/local assets ratio for the cooperatives in a given
cell. Finally, the fifth and last line in each cell identifies the
profitability ratio range for the cooperatives in that cell.
The cooperatives are concentrated in a diagonal from high ownership and
profitability (upper left corner) to low ownership and profitability
(bottom right corner) . Only six cooperatives have a profile of high
ownership and low earnings. These cooperatives experience a steady
decline in profitability from .086 in 1982 to -.017 in 1986. The other
sparse cell in the matrix, low ownership and high profitability, contains
only one cooperative. In 1986, this cooperative has a phenomenal earnings
year. From 1982 to 1985, this cooperative experiences an average
profitability ratio of only .054. Thus, this cooperative would normally
be in the low ownership, medium profitability cell.
The relationship between ownership and profitability originally
identified with the individual stratifications is again found in the cross
stratification. Moving left to right in the cooperative financial profile
matrix (high ownership to low ownership), profitability decreases as
ownership decreases. The result is similar when moving from the top of
the matrix to the bottom (high profitability to low profitability) . In
this case, ownership generally decreases as profitability decreases.
Since this study is primarily interested in equity redemption, the
equity redemption performance of each of the matrix's rows is first
examined and then equity redemption performance is examined for each of
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Table 2. A. 10. Ownership and Profitability Croas Stratification Working Capital and Financial
Ratios - High Profitability.
Working Capital
Otmexshio
Account
MiSh
251
Medium
50Z
Low
25Z
Total Funds Provided
Total Equity Redemptions
Total Funds Applied
534,730
136,987
499,910
668,104
124,587
559,083
402,895
21,072
410,130
Total Change in Working
Capital
Beginning Working Capital
Ending Working Capital
34,820
962,542
997,362
109,021
522,592
631,613
(7,235)
112,799
105,564
Financial Ratios
Ownership
High Medium Low
Item m 501 251
Solvency Ratio
Ownership 834 .630 465
Liouiditv Ratio
Current Ratio 3 63 1.76
Profitability Ratios
LE/LA .153 .130
EBI/TA .101 074 .087
NE/TA .097 .070 .081
Eouitv Redemption Performance Measures
Cash Patronage Z 37.34 30.96 20.05
ER/AE .062 .065 .020
ER/ME .0*2 .046 .016
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Table 2. A. 11. Ownership and Profitability Cross Stratification Balance Sheet and Operating
Statement - High Profitability.
Balance Sheet
Ownership
High Medium Low
Account 25] 501 25J
Total Current Assets 1, 463,333 1,778.284 1, 325,041
Investments 758,271 767,626 344,343
Property, Plant, snd
Equipment 1, 84,992 1,402,288 1, 215,552
Other Assets
3,
8,110 16,395
2
11,759
Total Assets .31*, 705 3,964,593 696,695
Total Current
Liabilities 465,971 1,146,671 1 ,219,477
Total Term Debt 49,441 274,262 329,603
Total Liabilities 515,412 1,420.933 1 ,549,080
Allocated Equity 2 .097,435 1,894,319 1 ,079.155
Retained Earnings 701,858 649,340 268,460
Total Member's Equity 2 ,799,293 2.5*3,660 1 ,347,615
Total Liabilities and
Member's Equity 3 ,314.705 3,964,593 2 ,896,695
Operating Statement
OwnershiD
High Medium Low
Account 25Z 50Z 25X
Total Sales 6 ,289,105 7,403,715 5 .087,383
Total Gross Margins 661,737 671,166 350.645
Total Other Income 629,302 832,599 592,619
Total Gross Income 1 ,291,040 1,503.768 943,264
Total Expenses 919,987 1,109,534 648,391
Total Local Savings 371,053 394,233 294,873
Patronage Income 10,159 15,210 26,338
Other Non-operating
Income (51,270) (133,072) (70,125)
Non-recurring Items (10,476) (14.101)
Total Net Savings Before
Taxes 329,941 266,152 251,086
Less: Income Taxes 14,122 16,103 17,213
Net Earnings 315,820 250,049 233,673
Current Petronage Refunds 259,464 183,472 180,795
Current Retained Earnings 56,356 66,577 53,078
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Tabic 2. A. 12. Ownership and Profitability Cross Stratification Working Capital and Financial
Ratios - Medium Profitability.
Work inn Capital
Total Funds Provided
Total Equity Redemptions
Total Funds Applied
High
251
367,544
75,954
383 , 399
Total Change in Working
Capital (16,355)
Beginning Working Capital 943,341
Ending Working Capital 926,967
Medium
501
411.522
46,084
369,975
41,547
461,453
503,000
Low
439,471
33,516
458,246
(18.775)
316,868
296,093
financial Ratios
Ownership
Item
High
m
Medium
501
Low
251
Solvency Ratio
Ownership .82* .630 .437
Liauiditv Ratio
Current Ratio 4.06 1.81 1.20
Profitability Ratios
LE/LA
EBT7TA
HE/TA
.092
.033
.032
.057
.018
.017
.05*
(.001)
(.002)
Foiiitv Redemption Performance Measures
Cash Patronage Z 28.75
ER/AE .038
ER/ME . 026
13.10
.030
.023
12.36
.022
.017
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Table 2. A. 13. Ownership and Profitability Cross Stratification Balance Sheet and Operating
Statement - Medium Profitability.
Balance Sheet
OwnershiD
Account
Total Current Assets
Investments
Property, Plant, and
Equipment
Other Assets
Blgh
251
1,355,583
698,301
1,131, 104
37,655
Medium
501
1,282,078
746,887
1,103,644
35,920
Low
251
1,907.517
837,255
1,345.269
26,641
Total Assets
Total Current
Liabilities
Totsl Tern Debt
3.222,643
425,974
170,170
3,168.530
779,079
392,073
4,116,681
1,609,423
789,993
Total Liabilities
Allocated Equity
Retained Earnings
596,144
1,932,656
693,843
1,171,152
1.566,685
430,692
2,399.416
1,341,492
375,773
Total Member's Equity
Total Liabilities and
Member's Equity
Operatip* Stat'
OwnershiD
Bigh Medium Low
Account 251 501 251
Total Sales 6,504,499 6,407,657 7,833,859
Total Gross Margins 576,555 571,052 704,728
Total Other Income 565,722 551,267 644.994
Total Gross Income 1,142,277 1,122,319 1,349,722
Total Expenses 976,856 985,777 1,176,711
Total Local Savings 165,421 136,541 173,011
Patronage Income 19,221 21,131 18,710
Other Non-operating
Income (54,117) (66.211) (152,775)
Non-recurring Items (15,771) (9,294)
Total Net Savings Before
Taxes 130,525 82,168 23.176
Less: Income Taxes 3,230 3,444 2,943
Net Earnings 127,295 78,724 20,232
Current Patronage Refunds 61,367 39,962 (41,628)
Current Retained Earnings 65,928 38,761 61,860
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Table 2. A. 14. Ownership and Profitability Cross Stratificatic
Ratios - Low Profitability.
i Working Capital and Financial
Working Capital
Total Funds Provided
Total Equity Redemptions
Total Funds Applied
High
252
63,809
44,970
173,715
Total Change in Working
Capital (89,906)
Beginning Working Capital 819,711
Ending Working Capital 729,805
Medium
501
135,208
18,249
152.836
(17,628)
363,650
346,022
Low
251
200,266
18,895
232,518
(32,252)
105,673
73,421
Financial Ratios
Ownership
I tan
High
m
Medium
501
Low
251
Solvency Ratio
Ownership 797 .836 413
Liouidltv Ratio
Current Ratio 3.11 1.90 1.10
Profitability Ratios
LE/LA
EBI/TA
NE/TA
(.017)
(.004)
(.00*)
(.036)
(.052)
(.051)
(.055)
(.071)
(.070)
Eouitv Redemption PerCo
Cash Patronage Z
ER/AE
ER/ME
rmance Measures
(30.57)
.039
.030
5.07
.019
.014
1.90
.015
014
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Table 2. A. 15 Ownership and Profitability Cross Stratification Bala:
Statement - Low Profitability.
Balance Sheet
Sheet and Operating
Ownership
High Medium Low
Account 251 50X 251
Total Current Assets 1,317,291 810,316 1,225,692
Investments 826,969 439,614 815,407
Property, Plant, and
Equipment 1,264,329 623,644 797,536
Other Assets 9,549 19,344 34,689
Total Assets 3,418,137 1,892,918 2,873,324
Total Current
Liabilities 587,487 464,294 1,152,271
Totsl Term Debt 176,931 242.420 574,155
Total Liabilities 764,418 706,714 1,726,426
Allocsted Equity 2,019.966 971,194 1,127,344
Retained Earnings 633,754 215,009 19,555
Total Member's Equity 2,653.720 1,186,204 1,146,899
Total Liabilities and
Member's Equity 3,418,137 1,892,918 2,873,324
Operating Statement
Ownershio
High Medium Low
Account 251 50X 25Z
Total Sales 3,187,967 3,536,586 5,777,595
Total Gross Margins 301,396 294 , 550 475,099
Total Other Income 218,356 539.363 468,354
Total Gross Income 519,752 833,913 943,453
Total Expenses 535,501 863,371 1,037,914
Total Local Savings (15,749) (29,458) (94.461)
Patronage Income 9,778 10.874 19,527
Other Non-operating
Income 1,416 (32,776) (66,328)
Non-recurring Items (8,219)
Total Net Savings Before
Taxes (4.555) (65,461) (153,738)
Less: Income Taxes (30) (104) (899)
Nst Earnings (4,525) (65,357) (152.839)
Current Patronage Refunds (7,064) (15,208) (18,122)
Current Retained Earnings 2,539 (50,150) (134,717)
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the matrix's columns. The data for these comparisons are contained in
table 2. A. 10 through table 2. A. 15.
The equity redemption performance measures for the high and medium
ownership profiles of the high profitability row are very comparable. The
equity redemption/allocated equity ratios are .062 and .065 for high
ownership and medium ownership, respectively. The .065 equity
redemption/allocated equity ratio is the highest in the matrix yet it
represents only a 15 year revolving fund equity redemption alternative or
a 6.5 percent percentage pool alternative. The high ownership, high
profitability cooperatives are providing their patrons with the better
cash flows, however, with a 37.3 percent cash patronage refund. The low
ownership, high profitability cooperative profile's equity redemption
performance is rather dismal with an equity redemption/allocated equity
ratio of only .02. In the high profitability row, the high ownership
profile facilitates better equity redemption performance with the highest
current ratio of 3.63 and declines as ownership declines. In addition,
the medium ownership profile has the greatest total asset size followed
by the high ownership profile ($650,000 less) and then the low ownership
profile ($1,068,000 less).
In the medium profitability row, the equity redemption/allocated equity
ratio and cash patronage percentage declines as ownership declines.
Again, the better equity redemption performance is facilitated by better
current ratios since they decline with ownership. The high and medium
ownership profiles are approximately the same size with $3.2 million in
total assets each. The low ownership profile in the medium profitability
row has assets totaling $4.1 million.
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The low profitability row experiences steady declines in the equity
redemption/allocated equity and current ratios as ownership declines. The
cash patronage percentage ranges from an unacceptable high of 5
. 1 percent
for the medium profile to a low of -30.6 percent for the high profile.
The negative value is possibly due to this study's assumptions on the cash
patronage percentage. The low profitability row profiles' low equity
redemption performance can be attributed to their inability to generate
the necessary cash flow.
Differences in the financial profiles are much less noticeable when the
contents of the ownership columns are compared. The current ratios of the
financial profiles in the high ownership and low ownership are similar in
their respective columns. However, the current ratio in the medium
ownership profiles declines with respect to profitability. In all of the
ownership columns, the equity redemption/allocated equity ratio and cash
patronage percentage decrease as profitability decreases. The financial
profiles in the high ownership column have approximately the same total
asset size of $3.3 million. The medium profitability cell of the low
ownership column contains the financial profile with the highest total
assets, $4.1 million. The other two financial profiles in the low
ownership column have $2.9 million in total assets. The medium ownership
column demonstrates a decline in total assets as profitability declines
from $4.0 million to the smallest total assets in the matrix of $1.9
million.
In summary, the analysis of the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base
for Kansas local grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives identifies
their general financial trends. Kansas local cooperatives are
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strengthening their balance sheets through significant increases in their
ownership ratios. While total sales are decreasing, total gross margins
have greater support yet still are decreasing. Total other income,
however, shows large increases through growth in storage and handling
income. Fro* 1982 to 1985, total expenses increase rapidly but in 1986
they are significantly reduced and as a result the highest profits are
earned in 1986. The size of Kansas local cooperatives is regaining
constant. Overall, equity redemption performance remains low from 1982
to 1986.
The various stratifications show the close relationship between
ownership and equity redemption performance and especially between
profitability and equity redemption performance. The individual
stratifications show that equity redemption performance is also slightly
dependent on cooperative si2e since larger cooperatives are more
profitable. However, this dependency is much less prominent in the cross
stratification. The financial profile matrix is useful in categorizing
cooperatives for future research and for determining equity redemption
performance targets for cooperatives in each profile. Oespite the
usefulness of this analysis, the equity redemption alternatives used by
Kansas local cooperatives have not been determined.
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B. EQUITY REDEMPTION SURVEY
Past Equity Redemption Surveys
One of the first equity redemption surveys of Kansas local cooperatives
is done by Manuel in 1950. Manuel concentrates on determining the amount
of inactive patrons in cooperatives. Field interviews are made with all
343 Kansas local cooperatives . The survey instrument is unavailable to
this study but according to his writing, Manuel states that cooperatives
"reported" information. If cooperative management reported their
subjective opinion instead of performing an empirical evaluation, the
amount of inactive patrons can be misstated. Manuel also did not
specifically analyze different types of equity redemption alternatives
because there are very few in 1950. In 1950, there is a great deal of
concern whether patrons' equity can even be paid to their estates.
In 1981, Newman's survey shows that the equity redemption situation in
Kansas local cooperatives has improved significantly. Based on two years
of financial planning and consulting work with Kansas local cooperatives,
several faults are found with Newman's questionnaire. First, the
questionnaire asks for a phenomenal amount of detailed information.
Cooperative management does not have the time nor the inclination to fill
out such an extensive survey. Second, some of the items asked for on the
questionnaire are not readily provided by cooperatives without special
computer runs or requests [Newman, KSU, 1983]. It is probable that these
items are cooperative management's subjective opinion and are not
empirically determined. Newman did report on three different equity
redemption alternatives: the specials alternative, the age of patron
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alternative and the revolving fund alternative.
Brown and Volkin's is the most recent national cooperative survey that
reports on equity redemption alternatives . However , their equity
redemption alternative analysis concentrates on only two broad
alternatives: Nonsystematic alternatives (specials and age of patron) and
Systematic alternatives (revolving fund, percentage pool and base
capital)
.
Equity Redemption Survey Procedures
Because of the limitations of the previous equity redemption surveys,
this study approaches the problem in a different fashion. The primary
purpose of this study's survey is to determine the proportions of Kansas
local cooperatives using the five common equity redemption alternatives.
Like Newman and Brown and Volkin, we are also interested in examining the
effect financial parameters have on the equity redemption alternatives.
This analysis and evaluation of the equity redemption alternatives is in
a hypothetical environment like Royer and Cobia's (Chapter III.). In the
hopes of future research, information is also requested on the related,
larger subject, equity management. However, the questionnaire's design
concentrates on limiting the amount of requested information.
The appendix contains the questionnaire. The first question (Q-l) asks
for the cooperative management to list their patronage pools (for future
research). The second question (Q-2) requires cooperative management to
mark the equity redemption alternatives they have used in the last five
years and rank their normal priority. The five a five year time period
is necessary because the local cooperatives have recently experienced two
regional cooperative losses which have affected many of their usual equity
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redemption policies. Questions number three through eight (Q-3 through
Q-8) request additional information on the cooperatives' equity redemption
alternatives to for evaluating the equity redemption performance of the
cooperatives. Admittedly, question nine (Q-9) was ill conceived and
required too much speculation and interpretation by cooperative
management. As a result, only the cash patronage percentage information
is deemed reliable. Question ten (Q-10) is used to determine the
membership (stock) investment of producers and nonproducers . By law,
agricultural cooperatives can only allow complete membership (voting
rights) to agricultural producers. The first part of question eleven (Q-
11) seeks to determine the distribution of voting patrons and nonvoting
patrons. The second part of question eleven on the age distribution of
member/patrons receives few responses and is not reliable. By asking for
the number of full-time employees and licensed grain storage capacity in
question twelve (Q-12), the size and efficiency of the operations can be
inferred. Question fourteen (Q-14) asks for the cooperatives' balance
sheet, operating statement, changes in financial position statement and
equity statement for their 1986 fiscal year. As mentioned previously, the
terminology and accounting in cooperatives is not uniform. By receiving
the requested financial statements, the statements are subject to only one
person's interpretation. The questionnaire is only four pages long and
yet a maximum 75 responses are requested. Newman's survey is ten pages
long and requests 178 responses.
As the cover letter in the appendix states, the questionnaire is sent on
December 12, 1987 to 210 Kansas local grain marketing and farm supply
cooperatives. The first priority return date is December 17, 1987. Fifty
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of the mailed surveys with financial statements are eventually returned
for a response rate of 24 percent.
Although the tabulations of the first 50 surveys produced expected
results, there is always the possibility of being biased. Since the
Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base analysis is not completed at this
time in the study, the 1988 Directory of the Kansas Farmers Service
Association is referred to which contains storage capacities for the
surveyed cooperatives [KFSA, 1988]. The average storage capacity of the
cooperatives in the directory is 1.7 million bushels whereas the average
storage capacity of the 50 returned surveys is 2.5 million bushels.
Following Newman's lead, a nonrespondent telephone survey is done.
Instead of a completely random sample, the nonrespondent cooperatives the
are separated into the following three even storage capacity groups:
Large Capacity - greater than 2.0 million bushels
Medium Capacity -1.0 to 2.0 million bushels
Small Capacity - less than 1.0 million bushels
Table 2.B.1, lists the numbers of cooperatives in each of the storage
capacity groups for the mail survey, the nonrespondent telephone survey
and for all Kansas local grain marketing cooperatives.
A 20 percent nonrespondent telephone survey or 42 cooperatives is
conducted. Thus, 14 cooperatives from each of the storage capacity groups
are randomly selected. At the end of each telephone conversation, the
nonrespondent cooperative are asked to send their balance sheet, operating
statement, changes in financial position statement and equity statement.
After a series of additional phone calls and mail correspondence, all of
the nonrespondent cooperatives' financial statements are received.
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Table 2.B.I. Kansas Local Cooperative Grain Storage Capacity Groups.
Random
Stratified
Survey
21
Total
Survey
7
Mail
Survey
14
Telephone
All Co-ods
Small 21 68
Medium 21 30 16 14 70
Large 21 41 27 14 56
Totals 63 92 SO 42 195
Average
Capacity (Bu.) 1,788,049 2,092,917 2,514,762 1,590,720 1,707,696
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In total, 92 cooperatives respond for an overall response rate of 44
percent.
Analysis of Kansas Local Cooperative Equity Redemption Survey
Separate runs are made for the 50 mail surveys (table 2.B.2), the 42
nonrespondent telephone surveys (table 2.B.3) and the combined group of
92 surveys (Table 2.B.4). The mail survey group is not likely to be
representative of the cooperative population because of size. In
addition, the mail surveys are probably biased since the cooperatives who
responded may be influenced by their equity redemption performance. For
this same reason, the 42 nonrespondent telephone surveys are biased
because of their relatively poor equity redemption performance. The
combined surveys are not representable because 45 percent of the surveyed
cooperatives are from the large storage capacity group. The solution is
to randomly select 21 cooperatives from each of the storage capacity
groups for a total of 63 cooperatives. Twenty-one cooperatives from each
storage group are chosen because this is the smallest number of
cooperatives in any one of the storage capacity groups (small storage
capacity group). The statistical run with the stratified random sample
of 63 cooperatives is the most representative of Kansas local cooperatives
and is where the analysis is concentrated.
From table 2.B.5, the estates alternative is the most used equity
redemption alternative. Over 95 percent of Kansas local cooperatives use
the estates alternative as their first priority (87.3 percent) or second
priority (8 percent) equity redemption alternative. The estates
alternative is not being used in combination with another equity
redemption alternative by 27 percent of the cooperatives. With 46 percent
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Table 2.B.2 Performance of 50 Kansas Local Cooperatives Compared to Type of Redemption
Alternative Combination.
Redemption
Combinations
Co-op
Using Performance Measure
Cash
Patr I
Equity
Turnover X
Ownership Local Local Current
I ROLA ROE Ratio
Size
Total Assets
Storage Capacity
Survey
S5, 165, 055
2,514,762 bu
WBC
S3, 259, 078
1,707,969 bu
1. Estates only : 3 6 0.0 2.0 64.3 4.09 6.6 2.0
2. Est. - Age 27 5* 26.7 2.8 62.6 6.56 6.4 2.0
3. Est.-Age-RF 3 6 38.0 6.3 79.8 6.65 8.8 3.4
4. Est.-Age-X 2 4 27.5 6.6 76.8 16.04 14.4 2.0
5. Est. -Age-Other 1 2 50.0 5.4 65.9 10.38 12.1 1.4
Sub-total Est. -Age 33 66
6. Est. - RF 11 22 34.5 3.S 68.5 6.12 9.7 2.6
7. Est. - Z 2 4 0.0 2.1 62.4 6.96 6.9 2.0
8 . Z Pool only 1 2 NA DA 78. 1 23.52 21.8 1.9
All Combined SO 100 27.0 3.3 65.7 7.34 9.06 2.21
Wichita BC (1966) a 201 16.4 3.3 63.1 5.30 7.76 2.13
Obtained from Wichita Bank for Cooperatives database.
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Table 2.B.3 Performance of 42 Kansas Local Cooperatives Compared to Type of Redemption
Alternative Combination.
Co-op
Using Performance Measure :
Redemption
No.? I
18 43.0
Cash
Patr 2
20.0
Equity
Turnover I
1.9
Ownership
I
Local
SOLA
5.83
Local
ROE
6.79
Current:
Ratio :
1.87 :1. Estates only 58.6
2. Eat. - Age 16 38.0 24.7 3.1 62.6 7.48 8.49 1.65 1
3. Est.-Age-RF 2 5.0 45.0 4.5 86.0 10.95 9.92 3.30 :
4. Est. -Age-* 1 2.0 0.0 7.2 73.3 5.98 1. 37 6.53
5. Est. -Age-Other 0.0
Sub-total Est. -Age 33 66.0
6. Est. - RF 3 7.0 36.7 21.2 75.1 10.59 11.45 2.23
7. Est. - Z 0.0
8. I Pool only 0.0
9 . None 2 5.0 0.0 0.1 48.0 5.71 7.74 1.30
All Combined 50 100 27.0 3.3 65.7 7.34 9.06 2.21
Wichita BC (1986) a 201 16.4 3.5 63.1 5.30 7.76 2.13
Size
Total Assets
Storage Capacity
WBC
S3, 259,078
1,707,696 bu
Obtained from Wichita Bank for Cooperatives database.
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Table 2.B.4. Performance of 92 Kansas Local Cooperatives Compared to Type of Redemption
Alternative Combination.
Co-op
Using Performance Measure
Redemption
No
21
/ I
22. S
Cash
Patr Z
17.1
Equity
Turnover Z
1.93
Ownership
Z
Local
ROLA
5.33
Local
ROE
6.77
Current
Ratio
1. Estates only 59.5 1.9
2. Est. - Age 43 46.7 26.0 2.9 62.6 6.84 8.46 1.9
3. Est.-Age-RF S S.4 40.8 6.0 78.7 9.25 10.51 2.9
4. Est.-Age-Z 3 3.3 18.3 9.2 75.7 11.56 10.37 3.5
5. Est. -Age-Other 1 1.1 50.0 5.4 65.9 10.38 12.10 1.4
Sub-total Est. -Age 52 56.5
6. Est. - RF 14 13.2 35.0 7.9 69.9 8.58 10.07 2.5
7. Est. - I 2 2.2 0.0 2.1 62.4 6.96 6.90 2.0
8. Z Pool only 1 1.1 NA HA 78.1 23.52 21.80 1.9
9. Hone 2 2.2 0.0 0.1 48.0 5.71 7.7* 1.3
All Combined 92 100 27.0 3.3 65.7 7.34 9.06 2.21
Wichita BC (1986) a 201 16.4 3.5 63.1 5.30 7.76 2.13
Size Survey WBC
Total Assets SA, 227,707 S3, 259, 078
Storage Capacity 2,092,917 bu 1,707,696 bu
Obtained from Wichita Bank for Cooperatives database.
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Table 2.B.5. Equity Redemption Alternative U.. by Kansas Local Cooperative.
First
Priority
Age of
Patron
Revolving
Fund
I Pool
Base
Capital
Total
Second Only
Second Priority
Age of Revolving X Base
Specials Patron Fund Pool Capital
27.0Za 46.0Zb 12. 8X 1.5X
1. 31"
8.0Z 46. OX 12.81 1.3X
Total
First
Priority
3.2Z
l.SZ
96. Z L
"
68. 3Z
All
Prioriti.
50. 8Z
20. 8Z
6.21
These are first priority and the only method used.
cTm> co-op. (3.2J) used no redemption method..
Source: Ken... St.te University
.trstlfle
cooperatives, December 1987.
rsndom sample survey o£ 63 Km... loc«l
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of the Kansas local cooperatives utilizing the age of patron alternative
as second priority to the estates alternative, 4.8 percent are using the
age of patron alternative as first priority. The third most used equity
redemption alternative in Kansas is the revolving fund alternative with
20.8 percent usage. Only 3.2 percent of the cooperatives using the
revolving fund alternative are using it as first priority. Otherwise,
they are using it as second or third priority. The percentage pool
alternative Is used by 6.2 percent of Kansas local cooperatives with 1.5
percent using it as first priority, 1.5 percent using it as second
priority and 3.2 percent using it as their third priority. None of the
cooperatives in the stratified random sample of 63 (or total 92)
cooperatives are using the base capital equity redemption alternative.
However, two cooperatives (3.2 percent) are using no equity redemption
alternative.
Overall, 96.8 percent of Kansas local cooperatives are using an equity
redemption alternative. This compares to the national 71 percent
determined by Brown and Volkin [Brown & Volkin, p. 5] . Many of the Kansas
local cooperatives (68.3 percent) are using a second equity redemption
alternative and 9.5 percent are using a third priority alternative.
Like the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base, the survey
demonstrates how equity redemption performance is dependent on overall
financial performance. The most noticeable item in table 2.B.6 is that
the cooperatives with the highest equity turnover percentages and
generally the highest cash patronage percentages are using either the
revolving fund alternative or the percentage pool alternative. Their
equity redemption performance is even more impressive when we consider
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Table 2.B.6. Performance of Kansas Local Co-ops Compared to Type of Redemption Alternative
Combination.
Co-op
Using Performance Measure
Redemption
Mo./ I
17 27.0
Cash
Patr X
20.0
Equity
Turnover I
2.1
Ownership
Z
Local
ROLA
4.86
Local
ROE
4.92
Current:
Retlo :
2.01 :1 . Estates only 62.8
2. Est. - Age 26 41.3 23.3 2.9 61.3 8.28 8.00 1.90 !
3. Est.-Age-RF 3 4.8 41.7 7.
A
79.3 13.12 12.67 3.33
4. Est.-Age-Z 2 3.2 12.5 7 2 74.9 11.18 11.13 4.44
5. Est. -Age-Other 1 1.5 50.0 5.4 65.9 10.38 12.07 1.41
Sub-total Est. -Age 32 50.8
J
6. Est. - RF 10 16.1 32.5 S.5 69.5 8.52 9.88 2.67
7. Est. - Z 1 1.5 0.0 2 7 70.5 8.6S 8.98 2.35
8. Z Pool only 1 1.5 HA HA 78.1 23.52 21.76 1.90
9. Kons _2 3.2 0.0 0.1 48.0 5.71 7,74 1.30
All Combined 63 100 0.0 3.8 64.0 6.84 8.08 2.18
Wichita EC <1986> a 201 16.4 3.3 63.1 5.30 7.7« 2.13
Size
Total Assets
Storage Capacity
WBC
S3, 259, 078
1,707,696 bu
aObtained from Wichita Bank for Cooperatives database.
Source: Kansas State University stratified random sample survey of 63 Kansas local
cooperatives, December, 1987.
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that these cooperatives have the highest equity turnover percentage in
addition to the highest ownership percentage. In combination with the
highest cash patronage percentage, this means that the cash flowing to
member/patrons is much higher than the cooperatives not using either the
revolving fund or percentage pool alternatives. These same cooperatives
possess the greatest financial strength with the highest local return on
local assets, highest local return on equity and highest current ratio.
These cooperatives' high profitability generates an environment conducive
to high equity redemption performance. Those cooperatives using the
revolving fund alternative are using a respectable 12 to 13 year revolving
period.
Over 50 percent of the cooperatives in the stratified random sample are
using at least a combination of the estates and age of patron
alternatives. This can be attributed again to Farmland Industries, Inc.
Ownership Retirement Program (age of patron) where the regional
cooperative participated in the equity redemption of the local
cooperatives' patrons. The cooperatives using only the estates
alternative have an equivalent revolving period of approximately 48 years.
The cooperatives that combine the age of patron alternative with the
estates alternative decrease the equivalent revolving period to 34 years.
When the surveys results are compared to Newman's 1981 study, three
percent more Kansas local cooperatives are only using the estates
alternative and that the use of the age of patron alternative has declined
from 64 percent to 50.8 percent. However, the use of the revolving fund
and percentage pool alternatives has increased from 23 percent to 27.1
percent. The financial condition of Kansas local cooperatives has
70
strengthened slightly considering that ownership percentages have risen
significantly (58 to 64 percent) yet local return on local equity remains
constant [Newman, p. 44].
The Kansas local cooperatives in the stratified random sample
demonstrate a superior overall performance when compared to those in the
Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base. Every performance measure from
the surveyed cooperatives is greater than the corresponding measures for
the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base. This survey is biased
towards the better managed Kansas local cooperatives since the data base
captures a much larger sampling of the population (over 85 percent).
However, our survey is not heavily biased in terms of size. The
stratified random sample has average total assets of $3.4 million whereas
the data base has average total assets of $3.2 million. In addition, the
average storage capacity of Kansas local cooperatives is 1.71 million
bushels and the stratified random sample has an average storage capacity
of 1.79 million bushels. Thus, the stratified random sample is biased in
terms of management but not in terms of size.
In summary, previous equity redemption survey work is updated by
developing and administering a survey. To protect the results from bias,
a mail survey and a telephone nonrespondent survey are done and an overall
response rate of 44 percent is achieved. In addition, a stratified random
sample is generated that is slightly management biased but not biased by
size. The equity redemption alternatives used by Kansas local grain
marketing and farm supply cooperatives are identified as estates, age of
patron, revolving fund and percentage pool (in order of use).
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C. DETERMINATION OF A PATRON ECONOMIC LIFE CYCLE
Justification of Patron Economic Life Cycle
The evaluation of equity redemption alternatives based on the concepts
of proportional financing and present value of member/patron cash flow is
entirely dependent on the pattern of patronage with a cooperative. As
mentioned previously, Hodges includes this assumption in his evaluation
of equity redemption alternatives. However, his patrons' pattern of
patronage Is determined with managerial estimates and not empirical data.
Royer and Cobia also provide for the patrons' pattern of patronage in
their work. They produce five different scenarios for patronage but these
too are only subjective estimates of reality. As a result, this study
includes an empirical determination of the patron economic life cycle
necessary to evaluate equity redemption alternatives.
Procedure and Assumptions for Estimation
The data for estimating the patron economic life cycle is farm operator
data obtained from Kansas State University's K-MAR 105 data base of over
2200 farms for the year, 1986. Total cash receipts from crops and
livestock from each operator are combined for total sales by operator.
Total sales by operator are then accumulated for each age represented in
the data. Examination of a plot of total sales by operator age, indicates
a definite separation in the data at total sales above $3.0 million. It
is further summarized that the farm operators above $3.0 million in total
sales do not utilize a cooperative. Thus, these are not included in our
estimation of a patron economic life cycle.
The data has a skewness measure of .13 (skewed very slightly to the left
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where zero defines a normal distribution) and a Kurtosis (flatness or
heaviness of the tails) measure of -1.41 (very little heaviness in the
tails since -2.0 is the minimum and positive infinity is the maximum).
This is contrary to popular opinion that the data is skewed to the right
(older age). Using a regression analysis, the statistical estimation was
a quadratic equation of the form:
y - ax* + bx + e
The dependent variable, y, represents total sales and the independent
variable, x, represents the age of farm operators.
Patron Economic Life Cycle
The statistically estimated pattern of patronage (economic activity) by
farm operator age is
:
Sales - ((-12,206.72)Age2 + (1,214,289 .46)Age - (20,575,617.06))
(-10.878) (14.935) (-15.365)
This is the empirically estimated patron economic life cycle. The patron
economic life cycle has an R- squared coefficient of .80. Because of the
data's good approximation of a normal distribution, a regression analysis
using an equation representative of a normal distribution would likely
achieve a higher R-squared coefficient. The patron economic life cycle
is considered to contain all the positive values of the estimated
equation. For ease of simulation, the equation is adjusted slightly so
the end points (where the estimated equation crosses the zero axis) are
whole numbers
.
Figure 2.C.1 illustrates the sales data and the estimated patron
economic life cycle. No explanation is available for the low total cash
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receipts for the 48, 49 and 50 ages.
In summary, a patron economic life cycle is empirically estimated using
Kansas farm operator data. The patron economic life cycle provides for
a more accurate evaluation of equity redemption alternatives. However,
from financial planning and consultant work, the estimated patron economic
life cycle is not truly representative of the patrons of Kansas local
cooperatives. The error comes from the available data. The K-MAR 105
data base contains extensive information on Kansas farm operators. A
large portion (15 to 20 percent) of Kansas local cooperatives' patronage
comes from landlords which the K-MAR 105 data base does not include. This
study assumes that the change in the patron economic life cycle with more
accurate data (including landlord data) will not extensively change the
evaluation of equity redemption alternatives.
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CHAPTER III. EVALUATION OF EQUITY REDEMPTION ALTERNATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION AND RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS WORK
Introduction
One of the primary objectives of this study is to empirically evaluate
equity redemption alternatives. In this chapter, the relationship of this
work to previous work is identified. Next, the assumptions and the
specific equity redemption alternatives used in the evaluation are
presented. The evaluation criteria are then discussed along with the
resulting equity redemption alternative evaluations. Finally, a switching
evaluation is done to determine the effect of switching from the age of
patron alternative to either the revolving fund alternative, the
percentage pool alternative or the base capital alternative.
Relationship to Previous Work
The traditional method of evaluating equity redemption alternatives
measures the benefits to patrons. Usually, benefits are measured by
discounting the patron cash flow and the equity redemption alternative
with the highest present value of cash flow to patrons is deemed superior.
However, Hodges suggests that equity redemption alternatives should also
be evaluated from the cooperative's viewpoint with evaluation criteria
that measure patron inactivity. Patron inactivity is a proxy for
measuring proportional financing. In addition, Hodges includes a
managerially estimated patron economic activity pattern in his simulator
for evaluation of variations of the specials, age of patron and revolving
fund alternatives.
To measure the basic cooperative principle of financing in proportion to
patronage, Royer and Cobia develop an evaluation criterion, the disparity
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index, that measures the degree to which a cooperative is not financed in
proportion to patronage. The disparity index "can be used to measure the
performance of an equity redemption alternative over time, compare the
performance of cooperatives or, through simulation, compare the
performance of alternatives [Royer & Cobia, p. 106]." Ranging from to
1, the disparity index measures the percentage of allocated equity not
held in proportion to patronage. A value of represents a situation in
which a cooperative is perfectly financed in proportion to patronage.
Like Hodges, Royer and Cobia provide for the pattern of patron economic
activity in their evaluation of equity redemption alternatives. Five
different scenarios are used: 1) patronage is constant throughout the
economic life cycle of patrons;, 2) patronage increases throughout the
economic life cycle of patrons; 3) patronage increases through the early
years of patrons' economic life cycle and declines as patrons move toward
retirement; 4) patronage fluctuates from period to period during the
patrons' economic life cycle and 5) patronage lasts only a few years.
Using these patterns of economic activity and their disparity index, Royer
and Cobia examine variations of the specials, revolving fund and
percentage pool alternatives. They did not examine the base capital
alternative because they claim it is computationally similar to the
revolving fund alternative. Royer and Cobia find that equity redemption
performance is largely dependent on the pattern of patron economic
activity and not the type of equity redemption alternative.
The Royer and Cobia work has the closest relationship to this work.
However, a measure called the proportionality index is preferred since it
measures the percentage of allocated equity that is held in proportion to
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patronage which is simply one minus the disparity index. Thus, a value
of 1 represents a situation in which a cooperative is perfectly financed
in proportion to patronage. Managers and directors of cooperatives
understand the proportionality index better since the higher the index,
the closer the cooperative is to the ideal of being financed in proportion
to patronage. A more complete explanation of the proportionality index
is given later in this chapter.
This study evaluates equity redemption alternatives by both criteria of
benefits to patrons and financing in proportion to patronage. A new
evaluation criterion, financial flexibility, is introduced in this
evaluation. To these evaluation criteria, the empirically estimated
patron economic life cycle from the previous chapter is applied instead
of the approximated scenarios of Royer and Cobia or the managerially
estimated pattern of patron economic activity. The estates, age of
patron, revolving fund, percentage pool and base capital equity redemption
alternatives are included in this evaluation. Royer and Cobia'
s
assumption that the revolving fund and base capital alternatives are
similar enough that they do not warrant a separate evaluation is not
accepted. Besides these deviations, this study also shows that Royer and
Cobia' s pattern of patron economic activity scenarios generate situations
that are not comparable and why their results are largely dependent on
these scenarios. Thus, their conclusions are generally correct within a
given pattern of patron economic activity but not across the patterns.
The result of this study is a more accurate look at equity redemption
alternatives and their impact on cooperatives and their patrons.
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B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR EVALUATION OF EQUITY REDEMPTION ALTERNATIVES
Computational Tool
A computer simulation model was developed to perform the computationally
intensive work of evaluating equity redemption alternatives. The initial
analysis was done with a spreadsheet alternative, Lotus 123. However, the
limitations of Lotus 123 as a simulator were quickly encountered as the
model became increasingly complex. Thus, another spreadsheet based
software package, ENCORE! Plus was used. ENCORE! Plus is a financial
modeling package with its own procedural language. A model was designed
with a top-down design in which errors were readily identified and the
model's code could be easily changed.
Lotus 123 and ENCORE! Plus are both personal computer designed software
for 100% IBM-PC compatible computers. The software was used on a Compaq
Deskpro 386/20 machine with an 80387 math coprocessor, two megabytes of
RAM and a 60 megabyte hard drive with an average access time of 27
milliseconds. Even with this state of the art hardware, the models
designed to evaluate the switching of equity redemption alternatives had
calculation times in excess of ten hours.
Hypothetical Cooperative
In the evaluation of equity redemption alternatives, a hypothetical
cooperative is developed for a representative environment. The
hypothetical cooperative has the following items determined exogenously:
1) the pattern of patron economic activity, 2) the equity redemption
alternatives used, 3) the type and level of equity capital and 4) the
cooperative is in a steady-state situation.
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The patron economic life cycle empirically estimated in Chapter II is
used to determine the pattern of patron economic activity in the
hypothetical cooperative. As figure 2.C.1 denotes, the patron economic
life cycle specifies that patrons begin patronizing the cooperative at the
age of 21 and after the age of 78, patrons are no longer economically
active in the cooperative. As a result, patrons are economically active
for 58 years. It is assumed that all the patrons of the hypothetical
cooperative are economically homogeneous at any given age. For example
in year 1, suppose the 47 year old age group presently controls 10,000
acres and 30,000 head of livestock. In addition, suppose these operations
use a $1,000,000 set of farm supplies and generate a $1,500,000 set of
commodities. In year 20, the current 27 year old age group (27 years old
in year 1) will control the same set of resources (10,000 acres and 30,000
head of livestock), use the same $1,000,000 set of farm supplies, and
generate the same $1,500,000 set of commodities. The patrons presently
comprising the 27 year old age group will represent the same amount of
economic activity in 20 years as the patrons presently comprising the 47
year old age group. The resulting hypothetical cooperative has 58 age
groups whose overall economic activity does not increase or decrease in
total.
To understand this study's analysis, it is essential to understand what
the patron economic life cycle in figure 2.C.1 represents. The dashed
line in figure 2.C.1 represents the level of economic activity by a
cooperative's patron age groups. Even though the total cooperative
economic activity is constant, the economic activity of the individual
patron age groups changes as they move along the patron economic cycle.
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In year 1, the 27 year old age group is responsible for 1% of the economic
activity of a cooperative. In nine years (year 9), this original 27 year
old group is 36 years old and is now responsible for 2% of the
cooperative's economic activity. In addition, another patron age group
has progressed along the patron life cycle and replaces the original
patron age group at the 27 year old point on the life cycle.
The five equity redemption alternatives used by the hypothetical
cooperative are the estates, age of patron, revolving fund, percentage
pool, and base capital alternatives. The specific variations and
combinations of these equity redemption alternatives are thoroughly
explained in the next section of this chapter.
Another exogenous factor in the hypothetical cooperative, is the type
of equity capital used by the hypothetical cooperative. Allocated,
revolving capital (deferred patronage refunds or per unit retains) was
used in the analysis. According to the analysis of the Wichita Bank for
Cooperatives data base, 78 percent of Kansas local grain marketing and
farm supply cooperatives' equity was in an allocated form in 1986. The
analysis considers the allocated, revolving equity as either qualified
equity (tax deductible to the cooperative when deferred) or nonqualified
equity (tax deductible to the cooperative when redeemed) but not a mixture
of the two.
The financial management of cooperatives is considered fundamental in
the evaluation of equity redemption alternatives. A key part of financial
management is determining the level of equity desirable for the financing
of the business, in this case a cooperative. The level of allocated,
revolving equity is endogenously determined by the specific equity
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redemption alternative used by the hypothetical cooperative . This
evaluation of equity redemption alternatives is the first to consider the
endogenously determined level of equity as crucial in the comparisons of
the alternatives. As a result, comparisons are only made on equity
redemption alternatives that generate the same level of allocated,
revolving equity and only general inferences are drawn from equity
redemption alternatives that generate different levels of allocated,
revolving equity. In this evaluation, the level of allocated, revolving
equity is called the capital target since cooperative management targets
this level of equity capital.
A steady- state cooperative is assumed with respect to the level of
allocated, revolving equity. Each year in the cooperative, $100,000 of
allocated, revolving equity is invested or deferred and $100,000 of
allocated, revolving equity is redeemed. The result is a hypothetical
cooperative that experiences no growth or decline in the level of
allocated, revolving equity.
The hypothetical cooperative has complete flexibility in exogenous
factors such as profitability rates, financial structure, distribution of
earnings as patronage refunds (cash and deferred) and other uses (taxes,
dividends, and retained earnings), asset growth or decline, working
capital and other cash flows. The only cash flows required are those
necessary for the investment and redemption of $100,000 of allocated,
revolving equity given the patron economic life cycle, equity redemption
alternative and capital target. The details of the variations and
combinations of the equity redemption alternatives are given in the
following section.
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C. EQUITY REDEMPTION ALTERNATIVES
Equity Redemption Alternative Capital Targets and Notation
Five basic equity redemption alternatives are used in the evaluation:
estates, age of patron, revolving fund, percentage pool and base capital.
These were briefly described in the literature review and further
references can be found in Cobia, Equity Redempti on: Issues and
Alternatives for Farmer Cooperatives and Barton, Equity ManaEement
Alternatives: Investment and Redemption . One deviation from these
discussions is that the version of the specials equity redemption
alternative used In the analysis includes only estates. Thus, from now
on in this discussion, the specials alternative are referred to as the
estates alternative.
As mentioned in the previous section, the evaluation includes a complete
comparison of only the equity redemption alternatives that achieved the
same capital targets or levels of allocated, revolving equity. Six
capital targets are used in the evaluation. Table 3.C.1 lists the capital
targets called U, V, W, X, Y and Z across the top of the table. The
computer simulation model solves for each capital target which is
determined by a given base equity redemption alternative. In table
3.C.I., the base equity redemption alternatives are distinguished with a
superscript of "b" . For example, capital target U is determined by the
combination of an estates alternative (estate age of 79 years old) and a
20 year revolving fund alternative.
Given the capital targets from the base equity redemption alternatives,
the remaining equity redemption alternatives are solved for with the
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Table 3.C.1 Assumed and Derived Parameters for Evaluation of Equity Redemption Alternatives
Redemption
Alternative
1. ES: Estate Age"
(Years)
2. AP: Age of
Patron (Years)
3. RF: Revolving
Fund (Years)
it. PP: Percentage
Pool (Z)
5. BC: Base Capital
(SI, 000, 000)
Other Parameters
1. TotaL capital
(SI, 000, 000)
2. Turnover (I)
Redemption Base Plan and Capital Target Levels
U V W X Y Z
Redemption Plan Parameters
8.97 3.16
. 98 1 . 82
0.50 0.98 1.82 1.70
20.07 10.20 5.48 5.89
N7
KF
3.93
2.55
Capital targets U, V, W, X and Y make an estate settlement 1 year following the end of the
life cycle at age 79. Capital target Z makes an estate settlement 10 years after the end at
age 89.
^Alternatives comprising redemption base plan upon which the capital target level in this
column is based.
HR: Hot realistic to redeem equity using the age of patron alternative since the age is
significantly lower than age 65.
NC: Not calculated since it would require a fractional age of patron such as 68.1, an
infeasible parameter for the simulator.
NF: Not feasible to redeem any equity using these alternatives since only one redemption is
made, a lump sum estate redemption at the end of the time horizon.
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model. Calculations besides the base equity redemption alternatives are
made for only equity redemption alternatives that are reasonable and
feasible. All of the equity redemption alternatives represented in table
3.C.1 either use the estates alternative by itself or in combination with
one of the other equity redemption alternatives such as age of patron,
revolving fund, percentage pool or base capital alternatives as a second
priority.
For simplicity, a short-hand notation is devised for identification of
specific equity redemption alternatives. For example, ES79 represents an
estates alternative that redeems equity at age 79. RF20 denotes a
revolving fund alternative that redeems equity according to a 20 year
revolving period. Combinations of equity redemption alternatives are
identified with respect to their capital target, first priority equity
redemption alternative and second priority equity redemption alternative.
For example, V:ES79+RF10 represents the equity redemption alternative with
a capital target of V, a first priority equity redemption alternative of
estates at age 79 and a second priority equity redemption alternative of
revolving fund with a ten year revolving period. The parameters of the
equity redemption alternatives such as estates paid at age 79 and a 10
year revolving period will not always be presented. A simplified notation
will be used such as V:ES+RF for V:ES79+RF10 and U:ES+BC for U:ES79+BC0.5.
Figure 3.C.1, illustrates the capital targets within the context of the
patron economic life cycle. With capital target V, the most a patron age
group will have held by the cooperative at any one time as deferred
patronage refunds is approximately $27,000. Since the amount earned
during the lifetime of any patron age group ($100,000) is independent of
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the capital target, cooperatives with higher capital targets will hold
deferred patronage refunds for longer periods of time to achieve the
higher capital targets. This results in patron age groups having a larger
maximum amount of deferred patronage refunds held during their economic
lifetime (approximately $78,000 for capital target Y.
)
General Formulas for Equity Redemption Alternatives
For a complete, in depth description of the specific equity redemption
alternatives in this evaluation, mathematical formulas for the
alternatives are presented. A general formula of equity investment for
the patron age groups is
(3.1) ej- bj+ ij - rj
where
j - age of patron group
.
ej - ending total equity investment for the j-th patron age
group
.
(3.2) bj - beginning total equity investment for the j-th patron
age group.
-
»J-1
ij - current equity investment for j-th patron age group,
rj - current equity redemption for j-th patron age group.
Beginning total equity investment, bj , is simply the ending total equity
investment, ej , of the previous patron age group. Since the patron age
groups move along the patron economic life cycle, the current equity
investment, ij
, increases and then decreases as patron age groups get
87
older. The current equity Investment Is computed by
(3.3) ij- $100,000 * pj
where
(3.4) pj - proportion of total cooperative patronage for the j-
th patron age group.
- (sj/ S)
(3.5) \ pj - 1.0j-k J
and
sj - total sales for the j-th patron age group.
S — total cooperative sales.
k - the first age of patron economic activity, 21.
n - the age estates are redeemed, 79.
$100,000 is the total current equity investment in the cooperative assumed
each year. The current equity investment for patron age groups is
independent of the type of equity redemption alternative chosen. However,
current equity redemption, rj
,
is entirely dependent on the equity
redemption alternative used. As a result, the levels of total ending
equity investment and correspondingly, total beginning equity investment
are dependent on the relationship of current equity investment and current
equity redemption.
The general formula for equity investment at the cooperative level is
much the same as for the patron age groups. In fact, the cooperative
general formula for equity investment is simply a summation of the
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individual patron age group general formulas
.
(3.6) E - B + I
where
(3.7) E - B
(3.8) E - Z eij-k J
n
(3.9) B - 2 b,>k J
n
(3.10) I - S U
'j-k J
(3.11) R - 2 ri
(3.12) R - I
Recall from the assumptions that the hypothetical cooperative is a steady-
state cooperative with respect to the equity capital target. Thus, total
ending cooperative equity investment, E, is constant and correspondingly,
total beginning cooperative equity investment, B, is also constant and
equal to the total ending cooperative equity investment. The total ending
cooperative equity investment and total beginning equity investment are
equal to one of the capital targets. The underlying assumption of the
steady-state cooperative is that current cooperative equity investment,
I, and current cooperative equity redemption, R, are constant, equal and
of the yearly amount of $100,000. Using equations 3.3, 3.5 and 3.10,
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current cooperative equity investment sums to $100,000.
(3.13) I - 2 l«j-k J
- E ($100,000 * pj)
- $100,000 * 2 pij-k J
- $100,000 * 1.0
- $100,000
From equation 3.11, however, current cooperative equity redemption is
dependent on the equity redemption alternatives since current patron age
group equity redemption is dependent on equity redemption alternatives.
As previously mentioned, the steady-state cooperative assumption specifies
that current cooperative equity redemption is equal to current cooperative
equity investment and $100,000. The descriptions of the equity redemption
alternatives give explanations and mathematical formulas for the
alternatives
.
Estates Equity Redemption Alternatives
In the explanations of the evaluated equity redemption alternatives, a
mathematical formula is derived and explained. The alternative
mathematical formula derivations are based upon both mathematics and the
characteristics of each alternative. A pattern of equity investment is
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then presented and discussed since a visualization of the equity
redemption alternatives is helpful in understanding their individual
characteristics
.
For Y:ES79, no redemptions are made to a patron age group until they
reached the estate age. The mathematical formula for Y:ES79 is derived
as follows:
n-1
(3.14) E r< - 0.0
j-k
Since this alternative has no redemptions until the estate age (from
3.13),
(3.15) bn - S ii - $100j-k J
000
and the estates equity redemption alternative redeems the entire equity
investment of a patron age group at the estate age
(3.16) rn - bn - $100,000
(3.17) R - S t,
j-k
n-1
- S ri + rnj-k J
- 0.0 + $100,000 - $100,000
Thus, Y:ES79 is represented by
(3.18) R - rn
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Figure 3.C.2 illustrates the pattern of equity investment with Y:ES. As
the short dashed line demonstrates, equity investment is built as quickly
as possible since there are no equity redemptions. Y:ES generates a
capital target of $2.93 million and represents the maximum amount of
equity investment a cooperative can acquire if the cooperative still
redeems estates. The capital target of any given equity redemption
alternative is calculated by summing the area underneath the alternative's
equity investment pattern. This is the same as integrating the
alternative's function. If patron age groups are perfectly invested in
the cooperative with respect to proportional financing, they will follow
the solid black line that denotes the capital target. The areas
underneath the capital target line and the equity investment pattern for
a given alternative were equal. In addition, the equity investment
patterns depicts periods of underinvestment and overinvestment by patron
age groups with respect to proportional financing. When the equity
investment pattern is below the capital target line, the patron age groups
are underinvested and when the equity investment pattern is above the
capital target line, the patron age groups are overinvested. The areas
of underinvestment equal the areas of overinvestment since overinvested
patron age groups compensate for the underinvested patron age groups and.
In figure 3.C.2., the Y:ES alternative experiences a long period of
underinvestment followed by a period of overinvestment.
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Z:ES89 demonstrates the results of a cooperative which delays estates
for ten years. Because the derivation of the Z:ES formula is similar to
Y:ES's, it is only presented as
(3.19) R - rn+lo- bn+10 - $100,000
As expected, the Z:ES alternative generates a capital target of $3.93
million since each of the additional ten years the estates are held by the
cooperative accounts for $100,000. In figure 3.C.3, the flat spot at the
end of Z:ES's equity investment pattern (patron age 79 through 89) depicts
the extra $1.0 million of capital target Y. Th Z:ES alternative has the
largest areas of underinvestment and overinvestment.
Age of Patron Equity Redemption Alternative
As mentioned previously, all of the equity redemption alternatives
contain ES as their first priority redemption. AP, RF, PP and BC are used
as a second priority redemption to meet the capital targets U, V, W and
X. The ES alternative is used as first priority in the combination
alternatives to more closely approximate the equity redemption
alternatives determined in the survey. Thus, the alternatives that use
a combination of equity redemption alternatives retain the ES formula as
a portion of their formulas.
The X:ES79+AP65 equity redemption alternative redeems estates at the
estate age of 79 and also redeems all of the equity capital invested at
age 65. The derivation for X:ES+AP is
(3.20)rn - ^ij
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65
(3.21) r65 - 2 ij - $100,000 - rn
J"k
Thus, X:ES+AP alternative's formula is represented by
65 n
(3.22) R - 2 i< + 2 li - $100,000j-k J j-66 J
- r65+ rn
The X:ES+AP alternative provides the capital target X of only $1.7
million since two redemptions are allowed instead of one as in Y:ES. Its
equity investment pattern is depicted in figure 3.C.4 (short dashed line).
This equity redemption alternative's equity investment pattern follows
exactly the Y:ES alternative until a peak is reached at the age redemption
of 65. The pattern then falls to zero and builds back to the estate
redemption. The areas of underinvestment and overinvestment are less than
the two previously described alternatives but still quite large.
Revolving Fund Equity Redemption Alternatives
The revolving fund equity redemption alternative is the base alternative
that produced the U, V and W capital targets. The U:ES79+RF5, V:ES79+RF10
and W:ES79+RF20 alternatives have revolving periods of 5, 10 and 20 years.
Because of the similarity of the alternatives second priority, revolving
fund alternative, only one formula for these alternatives is presented.
(3.23) rn - 2 ijj-n-t J
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(3.24) rj- ij. t
The ES+RF alternative's formula is defined as
n n-1 n
(3.25) R - S ij - S ij. t + E ij - $100,000
n-1
J-*3
where
the length in time of the revolving period.
The base equity redemption alternatives U:ES+RF, V:ES+RF and W:ES+RF
generate capital targets of $0.5 million, $0.98 million and $1.82 million,
respectively. The lower capital targets are possible since multiple
equity redemptions occur during the patron economic life cycle. The
equity investment patterns for the ES+RF alternatives are shown in figure
3.C.5 for capital target U, figure 3.C.6 for capital target V and figure
3.C.7 for capital target W. In addition, X:ES79+RF18
. 3 alternative is
illustrated in figure 3.C.4. The ES+RF alternatives' equity investment
patterns are identified with a long dashed line in these figures. In
general, the ES+RF alternatives follow the Y:ES and the X:ES+AP
alternatives in the beginning of the equity investment patterns. The
shorter the redemption period, the sooner the ES+RF alternative deviates
from the previous plans. Like the previous alternatives, the ES+RF
alternatives are initially underinvested and then overinvested. In figure
3.C.4, X:ES+RF reaches proportionality at a later age than X:ES+AP, yet
the overall areas of underinvestment and overinvestment are significantly
smaller for the X:ES+RF alternative.
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Percentage Pool Equity Redemption Alternative
The results of the percentage pool equity redemption alternatives are
generated by solving for the U, V, W and X capital targets. The
U:ES79+PP19.54, V:ES79+PP8.97, W:ES79+PP3.16 and X:ES79+PP3 .71
alternatives can be directly compared with their capital target
counterparts. The hypothetical cooperative is indifferent to equivalent
capital target alternatives when the level of cash flows and the level of
equity investment is considered since these factors are identical.
The U:ES+PP, V:ES+PP, W:ES+PP and X:ES+PP alternatives each redeem a
percentage of the ending equity investment each year. The ES+PP
alternatives are represented by the following derivation:
(3.26) rn - bn
n-1 n-1
(3.27) S ri - S ( q * bO- $100,000 - bnj-k J j-k J
The ES+PP alternative formula is
n-1
(3.28) R - bn + 2 (q * bO - bn + ($100,000 -bn )j-k
where
n-1
rn + S ri - $100,000j-k J
(3.29) q - the percentage of the total beginning equity
investment that is redeemed each year.
- [($100,000 - bn ) / E]
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Figure 3.C.4, figure 3.C.5, figure 3.C.6 and figure 3.C.7 present the
equity investment patterns for the X:ES+PP, U:ES+PP, V:ES+PP and W:ES+PP
alternatives, respectively. The lines with long and short dashes denote
the ES+PP alternatives. The ES+PP alternatives deviate immediately from
the other alternatives since they are the only alternatives that
immediately have redemptions. Because they redeem more equity earlier in
the patron economic life cycle, the ES+PP alternatives are the last
alternatives to reach proportionality. Other results of the ES+PP
alternatives are that they generate the largest estate redemption of the
combination alternatives and the underinvestment and overinvestment areas
are quite large.
Base Capital Equity Redemption Alternatives
Like the percentage pool alternatives, the base capital equity
redemption alternatives solve for the base capital targets of U, V, W and
X. In addition to estates, the U:ES79+BC0.5
, V:ES79+BC0.98, W:ES79+BC1.82
and X:ES79+BC1.7 alternatives redeem a portion of the overinvested equity
investment. The ES+BC alternatives' formula is derived as follows:
(3.30) rn - bn
n-1 n-1
°' 31)
j-k
rj
" j-k [ ° * <bj+ lJ " fJ )1;if (bJ + 1J" fj>> °-°
else
n-1
S rj- 0.0; if (bj+ ij - fj)< 0.0
and
n-1
X ri.!- $100,000 - bnj~k J
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where
o - the proportion of overinvestment to be redeemed.
- [($ioo,ooo - bn ) / s 0m+ ii- *i)lij-k J J J
for (bj + ij - fj ) > .
fj - the amount of equity investment required for proportional
financing.
(3.32) - (Pj * E)
With the parameters defined above, the ES+BC alternative formula is
n-1
(3.33) R - rn + Z ri - $100,000j-k
Figure 3.C.4, figure 3.C.5, figure 3.C.6 and figure 3.C.7 illustrate the
equity investment patterns for the X:ES+BC, U:ES+BC, V:ES+BC and W:ES+BC
alternatives, respectively. In these figures, the ES+BC alternatives'
line uses a series of dots and long dashes. In general, the ES+BC
alternatives reach proportionality the quickest since no redemption are
made until proportionality is reached as equation 3.31 specifies.
However, once proportionality is reached, a portion of the overinvestment
is redeemed. Since the ES+BC alternatives are triggered by their capital
targets, these alternatives follow the pattern of the capital targets
closely. The result is that the ES+BC alternatives have the lowest areas
of underinvestment and overinvestment.
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In summary, general formulas for equity Investment and redemption are
presented for the patron level and the cooperative level. Based upon the
previously presented assumptions and the general formulas, individual
equity redemption alternative formulas are developed. The equity
redemption alternatives' equity investment pattern are also examined and
underinvestment and overinvestment are discussed for each alternative.
In general, the ES alternatives generated the largest areas of
underinvestment and overinvestment since only one redemption is made. The
ES+AP and ES+PP alternatives have the next largest underinvestment and
overinvestment followed by the ES+RF alternatives
. The ES+BC alternatives
generate the smallest area of underinvestment and overinvestment. In the
next section, the equity redemption evaluation criteria are presented and
discussed.
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D. EQUITY REDEMPTION EVALUATION CRITERIA
Financial Flexibility
In this section, the evaluation criteria used in the measurement of
performance of the equity redemption alternatives described in the
previous section are presented. The three primary evaluation criteria
used in this analysis are financial flexibility, the proportionality index
and the present value of cash flow. In addition, a fourth measurement of
equity redemption performance, the equity turnover rate, is discussed and
comparisons are made between it and the other evaluation criteria.
The design of the equity redemption evaluations first concentrates on
financial management. The concern with financial management leads to the
capital targets. The first priority of cooperative management is to
determine the level of equity investment, a capital target, needed to
finance the cooperative. The level of equity investment is dependent on
several factors including but not limited to risk preferences, growth and
profitability. Once an equity capital target is chosen, cooperative
management must determine what are the best methods to control equity
investment and redemption or the overall capital target. This discussion
leads to the financial flexibility evaluation criterion. Financial
flexibility measures how well equity redemption alternatives adjust to hit
capital targets. In the selection of an equity redemption alternative,
cooperative management should select an alternative that permits them to
control the cooperative's finances instead of selecting an alternative
that limits that control.
106
Proportionality Index
The second evaluation criterion is the proportionality index which is
a financial measure that determines the percentage of allocated equity
held by patrons in proportion to their patronage. As described in Chapter
I, financing in proportion to patronage is a widely supported cooperative
principle. It can be justified in part on the principle of service at
cost. Equity financing is a cost incurred in a cooperative. If a patron
is underinvested in proportion to their patronage, the patron is
effectively receiving service at a lower cost than an overinvested patron.
Proportionality of investment causes ownership costs to be directly
proportional to use.
Royer and Cobia were the first to develop a similar measure of
proportional financing called the disparity index. The disparity index
measures the percentage of allocated equity held by patrons that is not
in proportion to their patronage. Using the same variables described in
the previous section, the disparity index (DI) is computed by
(3.34) DI - [( 1 | ei - f«|)/ 2E]j-k J J
Since the disparity index measures the percentage of allocated equity not
held in proportion to patronage and the proportional index measures the
percentage of allocated equity held in proportion to patronage, the
proportionality index (PI) is simply one minus the disparity index.
(3.35) PI - 1 - DI
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The values of the proportionality Index range from to 1 - the higher
the value, the closer financing is to the proportional financing ideal.
The proportional financing ideal is financing exactly in proportion to
patronage and the proportionality index has a value of 1. Although the
differences from the disparity index are slight, the concept of the
proportionality index is easier to grasp since higher financial values and
ratios are generally associated with a superior or more desireable
situation. In addition, the proportionality index is used to compare only
those equity redemption alternatives that generate equivalent capital
targets. Equity redemption alternatives that generate different capital
targets do not represent equivalent situations for the cooperative.
Present Value of Cash Flow
The third evaluation criterion is the present value of cash flow to
patrons. This financial measure determines the value of the equity
redemption alternatives to the patron. In the model, $100,000 of equity
is invested in the hypothetical cooperative by each patron age group.
Similarly, each patron age group receives $100,000 in redemptions during
their patron economic life cycle. As the general formulas demonstrate,
the pattern of investment cash flow is constant and independent of the
equity redemption alternative. Thus, investment cash flows can be ignored
in this evaluation. However, the pattern or timing of redemption cash
flow is dependent on the equity redemption alternative. By discounting
the different alternatives' redemption cash flows, an evaluation is made
on the present value of cash flow to patrons. The present value of cash
flow is calculated by
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(3.36) PV - 2 [rW (1 + d) J "k ]j-k J
where
PV - the present value of cash flow,
d - the discount rate , . 10
.
The redemption cash flows for each patron age group are discounted with
respect to the first patron age group. This Is analogous to evaluating
the equity redemption alternatives from the viewpoint of the first patron
age group. The value of the discount rate is .10.
From the patrons' perspectives, it is possible to compare equity
redemption alternatives that generate equivalent and different cooperative
equity capital targets with the present value of cash flow. When acting
in their own self interest, patron age groups are concerned only with the
investment and redemption of their $100,000 during their economic life
cycle and not with the cooperative
' s total accumulation of equity
investment. A present value index is generated to easily compare the
alternatives' present value of cash flows. Using the present value of
cash flow of the Y:ES alternative as a base, the other alternatives'
present value of cash flows are either fractions or multiples of the Y:ES
alternative. The present value Index (PVI) is calculated by
(3.37) PVI - PVh / PVES
where
PVh- the present value of the h-th equity redemption
alternative.
PVgs - the present value of the Y:ES alternative.
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Equity Turnover Rate
The simplifying assumptions of the hypothetical cooperative require that
it be in a steady-state and that $100,000 be invested and redeemed each
year. A more general way of classifying relative redemption cash flow is
the equity turnover rate. If the equity turnover rate is targeted instead
of the $100,000 redemption requirement, the same relationship between the
capital target and redemption cash flows is produced. This relationship
makes it possible to draw inferences between the proportionality index and
the equity turnover rate. In addition, cooperative managers are better
able to relate their equity redemption performances with those presented
in this study. The equity turnover rate is calculated as
(3.38) ETR - R / E
In summary, the evaluation criteria for equity redemption alternatives
are presented and explained with discussions and mathematical formulas.
Financial flexibility identifies the adjustability of equity redemption
alternatives to meet the primary objective of a capital target. The
proportionality index measures the percentage of allocated equity invested
in proportion to patronage for each redemption alternative. The present
value of cash flow and present value index discount the redemption cash
flows and determine the value of the equity redemption alternatives to the
patron age groups. Finally, the equity turnover rate is presented. These
evaluation criteria are used to determine the equity redemption
performances of the redemption alternatives.
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E. EVALUATION OF EQUITY REDEMPTION ALTERNATIVES
The results of the evaluation of the equity redemption alternatives
described in section C of this chapter and evaluated with the evaluation
criteria given in the previous section are presented. Organized similar
to the previous section by evaluation criteria, financial flexibility is
examined first followed by the proportionality Index, present value of
cash flow and finally the equity turnover rate. The summary of this
section identifies the relationships between the evaluation criteria and
ranks the equity redemption alternatives by the individual evaluation
criteria.
Financial Flexibility Evaluation
Financial flexibility is the ability of equity redemption alternatives
to adjust to meet various targets. The ES alternatives demonstrate the
least amount of financial flexibility because of their restrictions on
equity redemptions. Both the Y:ES and Z:ES alternatives have only one
equity redemption, an estate, and the result is a maximum accumulation of
equity. As the Z:ES alternative demonstrates, it is possible to achieve
higher capital targets by delaying the estate redemption. The ES
alternatives are very rigid and financially inflexible since they can not
achieve lower capital targets other than the maximum accumulations.
The X:ES+AP alternative is financially more flexible than the ES
alternatives since two redemptions are allowed, an estate redemption and
a redemption triggered by the age of patrons. Since the AP alternative
is considered to be a retirement plan, 65 is the youngest reasonable age
to redeem equity. Other ages up to the estate age are possible but at and
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beyond the estate age the alternative is simply an ES. As the AP age
increases, the capital target of the alternative increases to a maximum
of the Y:ES alternative. Thus, the X:ES+AP alternative has financial
flexibility in meeting only capital targets from X to Y if the redemption
age is raised. Capital targets between X and Y are only approximated and
can not be met exactly since it is unrealistic to use fractional ages.
The X:ES+AP alternative is fairly rigid and financially inflexible since
the alternative can not be adjusted for lower capital targets and because
capital targets can not be met exactly.
In this analysis, the ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC alternatives are equally
flexible financially. As the U, V, W and X capital targets demonstrate,
these alternatives can be adjusted to meet any capital target from a
minimum of zero to a maximum of the Y capital target. This is the
theoretical flexibility evaluation of these alternatives.
In practice, additional constraints are placed on the ES+RF, ES+PP and
ES+BC alternatives. Of the three, the ES+RF alternative is the least
flexible in practice, yet more so than the ES+AP alternative.
Cooperatives generally do not use revolving periods with fractional years
to adjust their capital targets. Instead, an integer length a revolving
period is usually selected. In practice, a situation in which the steady-
state cooperative assumption is relaxed, the allocated equity investment
in a cooperative varies with the investment and redemption cash flows
since management has targeted a revolving period, not a targeted amount
of equity capital. The ES+PP alternative is more flexible in practice
than the ES+RF alternative but less so than the ES+BC alternative.
Cooperative management is more likely to use fractional percentages than
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fractional revolving periods. If cooperative management targets a
percentage instead of a capital target, the ES+PP alternative smooths the
variation in equity capital since it averages the changes in investment
and redemption cash flows. The ES+BC alternative is the most flexible
alternative in practice. This alternative requires that cooperative
management target a level of equity capital, the capital target, each year
and the alternative adjusts the patrons' equity investments to meet the
capital target. Contrary to the other alternatives, the ES+BC alternative
requires cooperative management to determine a capital target instead of
letting the equity redemption alternative determine the capital target.
The general problem in practice is that cooperative management selects the
parameters of the alternatives, such as a 10 year revolving fund, instead
of a capital target.
In summary, the ES alternatives demonstrate the least amount of
financial flexibility followed by the ES+AP alternative. Theoretically,
the ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC alternatives are equal with respect to
financial flexibility. However, in practice, the ES+RF alternative is
more flexible than the ES or ES+AP alternatives but less so than the ES+PP
and ES+BC alternatives. The ES+BC alternative is the most flexible
alternative in practice with the ES+PP being slightly less flexible.
Proportionality Index Evaluation
The proportionality index measures the percentage of equity investment
of a cooperative that is held in proportion to patronage. As the
proportionality index description states, the proportionality index can
not be compared across different capital targets on the basis of the
equity redemption alternatives. Table 3.E.1 contains the calculated
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Table 3.E.1 Proportionality Index for Each Redemption Plan
Capital Level
Plan's Redemption
Alternatives U V W X Y z
ES
.6496 .5431
ES + AP
.7269
ES + RF .9482 .8895 .7894 .8043
ES + PP .9058 .8208 .7245 .7360
ES + BC .9809 .9267 .8017 .8207
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proportionality indices for the equity redemption alternatives in this
study. The proportionality indices for the Z:ES and Y:ES alternatives are
.5431 and .6496, respectively. At the X capital level, the ES+BC
alternative has the highest proportional index of .8207 followed by
proportional indices of .8043, .7360 and .7269 for the ES+RF, ES+PP and
ES+AP alternatives, respectively. The closeness of the proportional
indices for the ES+PP and ES+AP alternatives is surprising. However,
figure 3.C.4 shows the equity investment patterns for the two alternatives
and confirms the proportionality index calculations. The ES+AP
alternative reaches proportionality much sooner than the ES+PP alternative
and the ES+PP alternative has a much larger estate redemption. As a
result, the ES+AP and ES+PP alternatives have almost equivalent areas of
under and overinvestment. For the U, V and W capital targets, the ES+BC
alternative has the highest proportionality indices followed by the ES+RF
alternative and finally the ES+PP alternative.
The percentage differences in the proportionality indices between the
ES+BC alternatives and the ES+RF and ES+PP alternatives do not demonstrate
a straight forward trend between the capital targets U, V and W. However,
the V capital target has the greatest percentage differences between the
highest proportionality index of the ES+BC alternative and the
proportionality index of the ES+RF and ES+PP alternatives.
One inference that can be drawn between the capital targets and the
proportionality index is that lower capital targets generate lower
proportionality indices. Figures 3.C.2 through 3.C.7 demonstrate how
lower capital targets generate smaller areas of under and overinvestment.
The equity investment patterns of the lower capital targets generally
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reach proportionality sooner in the patron economic life cycle. The
larger the capital target, the longer it takes patrons to reach
proportionality given the equity investment constraints of the patron
economic life cycle.
Where it is possible to compare, the ES+BC alternative has the highest
proportionality index of the alternatives followed by the ES+RF
alternative then the ES+PP alternative and finally the ES+AP alternative.
In addition, lower capital targets generate higher proportionality
indices
.
Present Value of Cash Flow Evaluation
The present value of cash flow determines the value of the equity
redemption alternatives to the patrons . The present value of cash flows
can be compared across capital targets since each situation is redeeming
$100,000.00 during the patron economic life cycle. Table 3.E.2 contains
the present value of cash flows from each of the redemption alternatives
as calculated by the model. In addition, table 3.E.2 contains the values
for the present value index for the equity redemption alternatives . In
this discussion, the present value index is presented first with the
present value of cash flow rounded to whole dollars following in
parentheses. As expected, the Y:ES79 and Z:ES89 alternatives have the
lowest present value of cash flows. The Y:ES alternative's present value
index is 1.0 ($397) since it is used as the base for the present value
index. The Z:ES alternative's present value index of 0.39 ($153) the
lowest of all the equity redemption alternatives.
At capital target X, the ES+PP alternative has the highest present value
index of 8.75 ($3478) followed by the ES+RF alternative and ES+BC
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Table 3.E.2 Present Value of $100,000 in Redemption Cash Flow for
Each Redemption Alternative
.
Capital Level
Plan's Redemption
Alternatives JJ__ V H_
ES
ES + AP
ES + RF
ES + PP
ES + BC
-$-
397.40 153.21
1372.22
7731.24 4806.30 1894.812204.21
8239 . 69 5911
. 65 3117 . 74 3477 . 75
7302 .43 4119
. 07 1565 . 32 1799
.
24
Present Value Index Relative to Y:ES
ES 1.00 0.39
ES + AP 3.45
ES + RF 19.45 12.09 4.77 5.55
ES + PP 20.73 14.88 7.85 8.75
ES + BC 18.38 10.37 3.94 4.53
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alternative with present value indices of 5.55 ($2204) and 4.53 ($1799),
respectively. The X:ES+AP alternative has the lowest present value index
of 3.45 ($1372) for the X capital target.
For the U, V and W capital targets, the ES+PP alternatives again have
the highest present value indices followed by the ES+RF alternatives and
then the ES+BC alternatives. For the W capital target, the differences
in the alternatives' present value indices are quite large with 7.85
($3118), 4.77 ($1895) and 3.94 ($1565) for the ES+PP, ES+RF and ES+BC
alternatives, respectively. The ES+PP alternative is 39 percent greater
than the ES+RF alternative and 50 percent greater than the ES+BC
alternative. However, the percentage differences in the alternatives'
present value indices decrease as the capital target decreases in size.
For example at the U capital target, the ES+PP alternative has a present
value index of 20.73 ($8240), the ES+RF alternative has a present value
index of 19.45 ($7731) and the ES+BC alternative has a present value index
of 18.38 ($7302). This is only a six percent difference for the ES+RF
alternative and a 11 percent difference for the ES+BC alternative.
In general, the ES+PP alternatives have the highest present value of
redemption cash flow followed by the ES+RF alternatives and then the ES+BC
alternatives. The ES+AP alternative has the lowest present value of cash
flow at the X capital target and the ES alternatives have the lowest
present value of cash flow of all the equity redemption alternatives. In
addition, the differences in the present value of cash flows between the
equity redemption alternatives and the capital targets are positively
related.
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Equity Turnover Rate Relationships
The equity turnover rate measures the rate at which cooperatives
turnover their allocated equity and allows for evaluation of equity
redemption alternatives across capital targets. Since the amount of
redemption, $100,000, is constant across capital targets, there is an
inverse relationship between the equity turnover rates and the capital
targets. Table 3.C.1 presents the equity turnover rates for the various
capital targets. The lowest capital target, U, has the highest equity
turnover rate of 20.07 while the highest capital target, Z, has the lowest
equity turnover rate of 2.55.
This study is not designed to compare financial flexibility with equity
turnover rates. However, the ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC equity redemption
alternatives have the financial flexibility to generate the U, V and W
capital targets and thus, higher equity turnover rates. The ES+AP and ES
alternatives can not produce higher equity turnover rates than those in
table 3.C.I.
The proportionality index and the present value of cash flow have a
positive relationship with the equity turnover rates. From table 3.E.1,
the proportionality index increases as the equity turnover rate increases.
This relationship is also evident in figure 3.E.I. The order of the
equity redemption alternatives is not changed from the lowest equity
turnover rate to the highest equity turnover rates. In addition, each
equity redemption alternative demonstrates an upward progression as equity
turnover rates increase. The present value of cash flows in table 3.E.2
demonstrate a similar relationship with the equity turnover rate as the
proportionality index since higher the equity turnover rate generate
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higher present value of cash flows. As a result, the equity redemption
alternatives demonstrate an upward progression as the equity turnover rate
increases in figure 3.E.2. Like the proportionality index, the order of
the equity redemption alternatives is preserved as the equity turnover
rate increases.
Evaluation Summary
When the equity redemption alternatives are theoretically evaluated on
financial flexibility, the ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC alternatives have equal
ability in meeting capital targets. In practice, the ES+BC alternatives
are the most flexible followed by the ES+PP alternatives and finally the
ES+RF alternatives. Following these alternatives, the ES+AP alternative
is more flexible than the ES alternatives because the ES+AP alternative
has additional parameters and redemptions.
The equity redemption alternatives are ranked differently from the
proportionality index evaluation. At the U, V, W and X capital targets,
the ES+BC alternatives generate the highest proportionality indices
followed by the ES+RF alternatives and then the ES+PP alternatives. The
ES+AP alternative has the lowest proportionality index at the X capital
target.
The present value of cash flow evaluation ranks the ES+PP alternatives
as the highest in the U, V, W and X capital targets. These alternatives
are followed by the ES+RF alternatives and then the ES+BC alternatives.
At the X capital target, the ES+AP has the lowest present value of cash
flow. The ES alternatives have the lowest present value of cash flows of
all the equity redemption alternatives. In addition, the percentage
difference in the present values of cash flows of the equity redemption
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alternatives decrease as the amount of the capital targets decrease.
The proportionality index and present value of cash flow evaluation
criteria have a positive relationship with the equity turnover rate. A
complete comparison between flexibility and equity turnover rate is not
made since they have an independent relationship in this study. However,
the ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC alternatives have the ability to generate
higher or different equity turnover rates.
To choose an equity redemption alternative, cooperatives must first
prioritize the following: 1) financial flexibility, 2) financing in
proportion to patronage, 3) present value of cash flow to patrons and 4)
cost of administering the alternative. This is necessary because no
alternative is superior in each of these categories, yet it is possible
to eliminate a few of the alternatives. Of the five basic equity
redemption alternatives, the ES alternatives have the worst equity
redemption performance using the equity turnover relationships to compare
the alternatives. The ES+AP alternative has the lowest amount of
financial flexibility, the lowest proportionality index and the lowest
present value of cash flow to patrons of the alternatives capable of
achieving the X capital target. Thus, the ES+AP and ES alternatives are
considered undesirable.
The ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC equity redemption alternatives are the
remaining alternatives and choosing between them is not as simple. The
financial flexibility of these alternatives is considered to be equal
since an assumption is made that cooperatives are targeting a level of
equity capital instead of a redemption alternatives' parameters. When the
proportionality index is considered, the ES+BC alternatives are ranked
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first followed by the ES+RF alternatives and then the ES+PP alternatives.
The order is reversed when the present value of cash flow is considered
with the ES+PP alternatives ranked first followed by the ES+RF
alternatives and then the ES+BC alternatives.
Although the accounting costs of the alternatives are not included in
this study, it is possible to infer these costs from the amount of data
they require. Of the remaining alternatives, the ES+PP alternative
requires the least amount of patronage records - only the individual
patron totals for allocated equity. The ES+RF alternative requires
individual patron records by the year the patronage refunds are deferred.
Depending on the complexity of the specific alternative, the ES+BC
alternative requires a minimum of individual patron records on the
proportion of patronage in each of a cooperative's patronage pools for
each of the alternative's moving average years and the amount of equity
in each equity pool held by individual patrons. Because of the
significant differences in the accounting costs of the three alternatives,
these should also be weighed by a cooperative.
Based on the priorities set by cooperatives on financially flexibility,
financing in proportion to patronage, present value of cash flow to
patrons and accounting cost, cooperatives select their optimal equity
redemption alternative. An equity redemption alternative recommendation
based on the author's priorities is given in Chapter IV.
In this section, the results of this study's evaluation of equity
redemption alternatives are presented. Financial flexibility is examined
first followed by the empirical measurements of the proportionality index
and present value of cash flow. The relationship of the evaluation
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criteria is then examined in the context of the equity turnover rate.
Finally, a summary is given on the relationships of the evaluation
criteria and the equity redemption alternatives are ranked according to
the evaluation criteria.
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F. SWITCHING ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION
Justification and Methodology
This study's survey identifies that approximately 80 percent of Kansas
local cooperatives are using either the ES or ES+AP equity redemption
alternatives (See table 2.B.6.). The evaluation of equity redemption
alternatives determines that these alternatives are inferior to the other
ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC equity redemption alternatives. An obvious
conclusion to the results of this study is that Kansas local cooperatives
should switch from their predominant equity redemption alternatives, ES
and ES+AP, to the ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC alternatives. But to which
equity redemption alternative should the cooperative switch? The
evaluation of equity redemption alternatives suggests that cooperatives
have to prioritize several factors to determine which alternative is best
for them.
In practice, the present value of cash flow to patrons has a greater
weight than the other prioritized factors. Cooperatives are controlled
by their members who are represented by the patron economic life cycle.
As a result, switching to another equity redemption alternative is a
political issue within a cooperative's membership. The members ultimately
vote on which alternative to use.
Several models are developed to determine how the patron age groups will
vote on the equity redemption alternative issue on the basis of the
present value of redemption cash flows. The models determine the present
value of future cash flows to each patron age group in the patron economic
life cycle if the cooperative's equity redemption alternative is switched
126
from X:ES+AP to one of the following alternatives: X:ES+AP, X:ES+RF,
X:ES+PP or X:ES+BC. During the switching simulation, the level of
allocated equity remains constant at the X capital target. Each patron
age group has equal weight and ranks the alternatives according to the
present value of their redemption cash flow. These rankings are measured
in two ways: 1) the number of first choices and 2) the rank sum of votes.
The number of first choices measures simply the number of patron age
groups that prefer a given alternative over all the other alternatives.
This is assumed to be the result a democratic vote would produce if the
present value of redemption cash flow is the criteria for voting choices.
To put the number of first choices in perspective, the rank sum of votes
totals the rankings of each alternative
.
Results of Switching Evaluation
Contrary to the previous evaluation, this analysis makes a decisive
choice on which equity redemption alternative patron age groups prefer in
the switching evaluation. Table 3.F.1 contains the number of first
choices and the rank sum of votes for the ES+AP, ES+RF, ES+PP and ES+BC
alternatives. The ES+PP alternative receives 60.66 percent of the first
choice votes followed by the ES+BC alternative with 22.95 percent, then
the ES+AP alternative with 14.75 percent and finally, the ES+RF
alternative with only 1.64 percent. With the rank sum of votes, lower
totals are preferable. The ES+PP alternative has the lowest rank sum of
106 followed by the ES+BC alternative with 129, the ES+RF alternative with
139 and the ES+AP alternative with 187. The small difference in the rank
sums of the ES+BC and ES+RF alternatives and the low number of first
choice votes for the ES+RF alternative identifies the fact the ES+RF
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Table 3.F.1 Switching Alternative Evaluation
Votes
Alternative #1 Choice
ES+AP 9 14.75%
ES+RF 1 1 . 64%
ES+PP 37 60.66%
ES+BC 14 22.95%
61 1 100%
Rank Sura
187
139
106
129
561 2
For the age 78, all of the alternatives tied. Thus, they all
are counted as the #1 choice. There are actually only 58 birth
groups
.
2This total does not equal 580 [ (1+2+3+4 )*5 8] because of
note 1 and the fact that AP and RF are tied for ages 65
to 78.
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alternative has many second choice votes but very few first choices.
The switching evaluation unquestionably selects the ES+PP alternative
since this alternative has the greatest number of first choice votes and
the lowest rank sum of votes. In practice, cooperatives do not have
uniform memberships according to patron ages. Using figure 3.F.1 for the
ranking of the alternatives, they must weight the votes based on their
membership. From patron age 65 to 71, the ES+PP alternative is ranked
first followed by the ES+BC alternative and the ES+RF and ES+AP
alternatives are tied for third. From patron age 72 to 77, the ES+BC
alternative is ranked first followed by the ES+PP alternative and the
ES+RF and ES+AP alternatives are again tied for third. At patron age 78,
all of the alternatives are tied for the first choice.
In summary, patron age groups choose to switch from the ES+AP
alternative to the ES+PP alternative. However, cooperatives would need
to do a similar analysis if their membership is weighted different than
has been assumed In this study. If a cooperative's membership is similar
to this study's, figure 3.F.1 can be used to determine a directionally
correct membership vote.
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CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The financial condition of Kansas local grain marketing and farm supply-
cooperatives is excellent according to the rankings of Brown and Volkin.
This study examines the financial condition of Kansas local cooperatives
through the analysis of the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base from
1982 to 1986. Significant financial trends of Kansas local cooperatives
include a steady increase in ownership and an increase in the current
ratio. In addition, Kansas local cooperatives have a large decline in
total gross margins
,
yet a larger increase in total other income due to
an increase in storage and handling income. The equity redemption
performance of Kansas local cooperatives makes a slight, steady decline
and is relatively poor from 1982 to 1986. Kansas local cooperatives show
no growth in total assets from 1982 to 1986.
Individual stratification of the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives by
ownership and profitability demonstrates that equity redemption
performance is related to both of these financial measures. Because
ownership and profitability are also shown to be related, a cross
stratification of the data base is done to further identify relationships
between ownership and profitability. Profitability is identified as
crucial in generating enough cash flow to provide for higher equity
redemption performances and greater equity investment which increases
ownership
.
The equity redemption survey of Kansas local cooperatives identifies
their use of equity redemption alternatives. To protect the results from
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bias, a mail survey and a nonrespondent telephone survey are made with an
overall response rate of 44 percent. In order of use, the equity
redemption alternatives are identified as estates, age of patron,
revolving fund and percentage pool. Approximately 80 percent of Kansas
local cooperatives are using the estates or age of patron equity
redemption alternatives alone or in combination.
Equity redemption alternatives are evaluated in the context of an
empirically estimated patron economic life cycle and a steady-state
hypothetical cooperative. The patron economic life cycle determines the
economic activity pattern for patrons and is essential in evaluating
equity redemption alternatives. The evaluation criteria include financial
flexibility, the proportionality index and the present value of cash flow.
In addition, the relationship of the evaluation criteria and the equity
turnover rate are examined. The equity redemption alternatives include
the estates, age of patron, revolving fund, percentage pool and base
capital alternatives. The equity redemption alternatives are evaluated
at six different levels of allocated equity or capital targets. Each
capital target represents an incomparable situation in the context of the
proportionality index evaluation criterion since the proportionality index
is not independent of the different capital target levels.
Theoretically, the revolving fund, percentage pool and base capital
alternatives have equal amounts of financial flexibility. In practice,
the base capital alternative has the greatest financial flexibility
followed by the percentage pool alternative and then the revolving fund
alternative. Theoretically, and in practice, the age of patron
alternative is ranked fourth in financial flexibility and is followed by
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Che estates alternative.
By the proportionality index evaluation criterion, the base capital
alternative is ranked first followed by the revolving fund alternative,
then the percentage pool alternative and finally the age of patron
alternative. Using the equity turnover rate relationships, the estates
alternative is ranked last according to the proportionality index. The
present value of cash flow criterion ranks the percentage pool alternative
as the best followed by the revolving fund alternative. The base capital
alternative is ranked third by the present value of cash flow followed by
the age of patron alternative and the estates alternative is again ranked
last.
The evaluation of equity redemption alternatives does determine that the
estates and age of patron alternatives are inferior to the other
alternatives but the evaluation does not clearly determine which of the
other alternatives is superior. If the present value of cash flow is
highest priority, the percentage pool alternative is chosen. If
proportionality is the most important, base capital is chosen. In
addition to the accounting cost of the alternatives, cooperatives must
prioritize and weight the evaluation criteria to determine their
individually superior equity redemption alternative.
Since 80 percent of Kansas local cooperatives are using the inferior
estate and age of patron alternatives, a switching evaluation is done to
determine which equity redemption alternative is chosen by the cooperative
members. This is reasonable since the members control the cooperative.
In the switching evaluation using present value of cash flow as the
evaluation criteria, the percentage pool alternative is clearly superior
133
to the other alternatives in the number of first choices it received and
by its rank sum.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
This study makes the following recommendations:
1. The percentage pool alternative is the recommended equity
redemption alternative on the basis of present value of cash flow
which measures the degree to which cooperatives are providing
service at cost. It is superior or equal to the other alternatives
in financial flexibility if used properly (management selects
capital targets) and ranks third in the context of the
proportionality index. In addition, the percentage pool
alternative generates the highest present value of cash flow in the
steady- state cooperative and is preferred by 61 percent of the
member/patrons in the switching evaluation. The percentage pool
alternative is also one of the simplest equity redemption
alternatives to administer since it requires a minimum amount of
information. However, the base capital alternative is the
recommended equity redemption alternative on the basis of
proportionality.
2. To determine the effect of the percentage pool alternative or other
alternatives on individual cooperatives, detailed financial
planning is necessary and recommended. Barton and Schmidt have
developed a comprehensive indepth financial simulator called
AGRIBIZ/FINPLAN. AGRIBIZ/FINPLAN is a user-friendly, menu driven
software program for use on IBM-PC compatible computers [Barton &
Schmidt, 1987]. It is designed for grain marketing and farm supply
cooperatives and the program incorporates all combinations of the
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equity redemption alternatives used in this study.
Further research on the ownership and profitability cross
stratification of the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base is
recommended. The thrust of the future research on the present
cross stratification should determine how cooperatives should move
from one cell to other cells in the cross stratification matrix
presented in table 2. A. 9. In addition, other stratifications and
cross stratifications are encouraged on other parameters in the
data base.
The pattern of patron economic activity is estimated from farm
operator data. Farm operator data is not completely representative
of patron economic activity because it does not contain landlord
data. It is advised that more representative data be obtained that
includes data on landlords and that the patron economic life cycle
be reestimated using the more representative data. In addition,
future research is recommended to investigate the effects of
skewing (especially to older patrons) the representative patron
population.
This study's present value of cash flow analysis is done with only
one discount rate (10%). A sensitivity analysis on the effect of
the discount rate on the present value of cash flow and the
switching evaluation is recommended.
Finally, it is recommended that the results of this study be
incorporated into a risk analysis study to determine the optimal
financial and equity structure for Kansas local grain marketing and
farm supply cooperatives
.
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In summary, the financial condition of Kansas local grain marketing
cooperatives is examined and the equity redemption alternatives of these
cooperatives are identified and evaluated. From the equity redemption
evaluation, the percentage pool equity redemption alternative is
recommended for use by cooperatives on the basis of financial flexibility,
financing in proportion to patronage and the present value of cash flow
to patrons. However, more representative data needs to be obtained and
then the evaluation of the equity redemption alternatives needs to be
repeated and validated. Additional recommendations are made to ensure
that Kansas local cooperatives are doing financial planning to examine the
effect of switching to the percentage pool equity redemption alternative.
For these cooperatives to remain a viable supply and marketing outlet for
patrons
,
other recommendations are made to provide for the optimal
financial management of Kansas local cooperatives.
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Arthur Capper Cooperative Center
Department of Agricultural Economics
Waters Hall
Manhattan. Kansas 66506
913-532-5823
December 12, 1987
TO: General Managers
FRCM: David G. Barton, Director
Royce Schmidt, Extension Assistant
RE: Request for information on equity management practices in
cooperatives
We are conducting a special study of equity management in grain
marketing and farm supply cooperatives.
We are analyzing both the investment methods, such as by direct purchase
and deferred patronage refunds, and the redemption methods, such as by
estate settlements, patron birth year (age of patron)
,
year deferred
(age of equity or revolving fund)
,
percentage of all equities and base
capital
.
Our ultimate objective is to determine the methods that best fit your
needs given the specific situation in which your co-op may find itself.
For example, what methods are best if you currently redeem at age 70 of
patron, have a strong balance sheet, have strong earnings and want to
put more money in the hands of patrons? Should you move towards age 65?
Switch to another redemption method such as a revolving fund? Increase
cash patronage? This is a complex problem. Some equity management
alternatives are feasible and some infeasible for a particular co-op in
a given situation (asset needs, equity levels, cash flow, etc.)
Our immediate objective is to detgermine what methods are currently
being used. Preliminary information will be presented at the 1988
Symposium on Cooperative Issues in Hutchinson on Januarv 13. Earlier
you and your board president were sent a program brochure. Another
brochure is enclosed. We hope you and members of your board are
planning on attending.
We need your help in determining the current equity management practices
of cooperatives in Kansas. This information is very important in
preparing for the symposium and conducting our study.
A short survey is enclosed. Please complete this survey and return itin the enclosed postage paid envelope by December 19 if possible but no
later than December 31, 1987. The individual cooperative information
will be kept strictly confidential. Thanks for your cooperation.
DGB:gab
P.S. If you decide to attend the symposium by the above survey return
deadline, feel free to include your registration form along with
the survey in the enclosed envelope.
1.39
EQUITY. MANAGEMENT SURVEY
Q-l. list your cooperative's patronage pools (e.g., grain, farm supply).
1. 6-
2. 7.
3. 8.
4. 9.
5. 10.
Q-2. Mark the Equity Redemption Policies methods used in the last 5 years (for
your cooperative's deferred patronage) and your cooperative's current
redemption priorities (with "1" representing the highest priority) . Mark
only the appropriate blanks for your cooperative.
Type Normal
Used Priority Equity Redemption Method
NONE - No equity redemption method used.
SPECIAL - Estates, Moveouts, Retirement or Quit
Farming, Hardships, and Setoffs.
PATRON AGE - Equity is redeemed according to the birth
year or age of patrons.
REVOLVING FUND - Equity is redeemed according to the
year in which the equity was earned or
deferred. Also called the Equity Age
Plan.
% POOL - A percentage of the deferred
patronage/revolving fund is redeemed each
year. Also called percentage of all
equities.
BASE CAPITAL - Investment in a cooperative is
proportional to the amount of business or
patronage done by the member with the
cooperative. A version of this plan is
used by Union Equity. Also referred to
as the Modified Revolving Fund Plan or
Proportional Investment Plan.
OTHER (specify)_
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Q-3. If ycur redemption method is NONE (you are not redeeming any deferred
patronage) , why are you not redeeming equity? (circle one)
1. Insufficient funds to redeem any equity.
2. We have no allocated equity that ever revolves to patrons.
3. Other (please specify)
Q-4. If you redeem equity with the SPECIAL Equity Redemption Plan, do you
currently buy insurance to cover unexpected estates? (circle one)
1. YES, and our insurance coverage is for all of our patrons.
2. YES, and our insurance is for selected patrons only.
Please
explain:
3. NO, our cooperative does not buy such insurance.
Q-5. If you normally redeem equity with the PATRON AGE Equity Redemption Plan,
1) in what fiscal year did you last redeem equity and 2) what birth
year(s) did you last redeem? (fill in the blanks)
1. FISCAL YEAR 2. PATRON BIRTH YEAR(S)
Q-6. If you normally redeem equity with the PATRON AGE Equity Redemption Plan,
do you allow patrons to earn equity (deferred patronage) after they have
reached the redemption age? (circle one)
1. NO 2. YES
If YES, how is equity redeemed to patrons who have passed the redemption
age but continue to earn patronage? (e.g. , then redeem only as an estate)
Q-7. If you normally redeem equity with the REVOLVING FUND/EQUITY AGE Equity
Redemption Plan, 1) in what fiscal year did you last redeem equity and 2)
what fiscal year(s) equity did you redeem? (fill in the blanks)
1. FISCAL YEAR 2. FISCAL YEAR (S) REDEEMED
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Q-8. If you normally redeem equity with the % POOL Equity Redemption Plan, 1)
what is the percentage used and 2) how is this percentage determined?
(fill in the blanks)
1. PERCENTAGE USED FOR % POOL
2. HOW DETERMINED (e.g., fixed at set rate by policy, flexible
depending on funds available)
Q-9. What were your total increases (investments) and decreases (redemptions and
writedowns or cancellations) to your cooperative's total deferred
patronage/revolving fund during the following fiscal years? (fill in the
blanks)
FISCAL YEAR
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
CASH PATRONAGE %
INCREASES:
CURRENT DEFERRED
PATBDNAGE REFUNDS ($)
DECREASES:
EQUITY REDEMPTIONS ($)
CANCELLATIONS ($)
DEFERRED PATRONAGE REFUNDS/
REVOLVING FUND BALANCE
(This equals the sum of the ending balances of the nancurrent portions of
deferred patronage refunds/revolving fund, per unit retains, and other
earnings retained and distributed to individual patrons. Does not include
common stock and memberships.)
Q-10. What methods do you use to grant voting and nonvoting members (patrons)
common stock or membership investment? This is investment which does not
revolve or is not redeemed except for special situations such as estates,
move outs, quit farming, and hardships, (fill in the blanks)
VOTING MEMBERS
DIRECT PURCHASE (PER MEMBER)
EARNED THROUGH
PATRONAGE (PER MEMBER)
MINIMUM
MAXIMUM
(Q-10. continued on the following page)
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Q-10. Continued
NONVOTING MEMBERS (circle one)
1. Nonprcducers do not receive patronage refunds and therefore
have no investment.
2. Nonproducers use the sane method as producers.
3. Nonproducers use a different method as follows:
DIRECT PURCHASE (PER MEMBER)
EARNED THROUGH
PATRONAGE (PER MEMEER)
MINIMUM
MAXIMUM
Q-ll. What is the number of patrons who have an investment in the cooperative's
deferred patronage/revolving fund and what is the amount of their
investment? (fill in the blanks)
Number $ Investment
VOTING MEMBER (PATRONS)
NONVOTING MEMBER (PATRONS)
TOTAL
If Available Divide TOTAL By:
OVER AGE 65
65 AND UNDER
Q-12. What was the number of your cooperative's full-time employees and your
licensed grain storage capacity as of December 1, 1987? (fill in the
blanks)
1. FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES 2. LICENSED STORAGE
Q-13. What is your cooperative's name and city? (fill in the blanks)
NAME
CITY
Q-14. Please include with this survey a copy of your cooperative's Balance Sheet
and Operating Statement from your 1986 fiscal year and if available, your
1987 fiscal year. A copy of your cooperative's Changes in Financial
Position Statement(s)
, and Equity Statement(s) would also be appreciated.
Please return in the accompanying postage paid envelope by December 19 if
possible but no later than December 31, 1987. Thank you.
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ABSTRACT
An analysis of the financial condition of Kansas local cooperatives is made
with data from the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives. These cooperatives have
strengthened their financial condition significantly from 1982 to 1986 with
increases in ownership and profitability, yet their equity redemption
performance has remained low. An equity redemption survey is conducted to
determine the current equity redemption alternatives being used by Kansas
local cooperatives and to compare the financial condition of cooperatives
using different alternatives. The survey achieves a sampling rate of 44
percent and determines that approximately 80 percent of Kansas local
cooperatives are using only the estates equity redemption alternative or the
estates alternative in combination with the age of patron equity redemption
alternative. Both the analysis of the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives data base
and the equity redemption survey results suggest that equity redemption
performance is highly dependent on profitability.
This study is the first to empirically estimate a pattern of patron
economic activity and use the estimated pattern to evaluate equity redemption
alternatives. The estates, age of patron, revolving fund, percentage pool and
base capital equity redemption alternatives are evaluated on financial
flexibility, financing in proportion to patronage and present value of cash
flow to patrons. The revolving fund, percentage pool and base capital
alternatives have superior financial flexibility. The base capital
alternative provides for the closest financing in proportion to patronage. In
addition to the percentage pool alternative's simplicity, this alternative
generates the highest present value of cash flow to patrons and is chosen by
patrons in a simulation that switches alternatives from age of patron to
either the percentage pool, revolving sfund or base capital alternatives.
